Summary
This paper considers the issue of police-executive relations principally from the executive perspective, examining two central questions. First, what are the mechanisms which constrain and define executive accountability and police oversight in Canada? Second, can the need for the police to remain apolitical and autonomous be reconciled with these mechanisms of governance and accountability? It then outlines an “apolitical and autonomous” model, able to reconcile the need for political input into policing while countering inappropriate political interference in policing. The paper is divided into three sections. Part I outlines the apolitical and autonomous ideal type of executive-police relations as the best suited model for a constitutional democracy such as Canada. The second section explores how this ideal is furthered or hindered by the current executive-police terrain in Canada, with special emphasis on the respective role of courts, administrative bodies and ministerial responsibility in the oversight of the executive-police relationship. The boundaries between the police and other aspects of the executive branch of government often turns on the distinction between police policy and police operations, and the author argues that the policy/operation dichotomy is maintained not because it accords with a readily identifiable boundary but rather because we have yet to discover any other way of distinguishing legitimate government interests from illegitimate ones. The third section sketches the apolitical and autonomous police model as an alternative framework for discerning the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate executive involvement in policing, and for ensuring that neither the police nor the executive can unilaterally impose its will on the other.
Contents
1. In search of an ideal type of executive-police relations -- 1.1. Political but not partisan -- 1.2. Autonomous but not independent -- 2. The executive-police relationship in Canada -- 2.1. Administrative dynamics -- 2.1.1. Civilian oversight -- 2.1.2. Police boards -- 2.1.3. Public inquests, inquiries, reviews, task forces and advisory panels -- 2.2. Legal dynamics -- 2.2.1. Rule of Law -- 2.2.2. Federalism -- 2.2.3. Charter rights -- 2.2.4. Civil liability for misuse of police power -- 2.3. Political dynamics -- 3. Reconciling political accountability with the rule of law : toward an apolitical and autonomous police model -- 3.1. Moving beyond the policy/operation distinction -- 3.2. Coming to terms with the separation of powers and Parliamentary oversight -- 3.3. New approaches to budgets, appointments and other political levers of influence -- 3.4. Toward an integrated approach to executive-police oversight.