How National Security and Intelligence Institutions Engage with Racialized Communities

How National Security and Intelligence Institutions Engage with Racialized Communities PDF Version 865 KB)

Table of contents

• Executive Summary
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Relations with Racialized Communities
• 3. Governance
• 4. Artificial Intelligence
• Annex A: Summary of our recommendations
• Annex B: NS-TAG Meeting Highlights, May 2021 – February 2022
• Annex C: Canadian and International National Security Engagement Activities

Executive Summary

The National Security Transparency Advisory Group (NS-TAG) was created in 2019 as an independent and external body. Our role is to advise the Deputy Minister of Public Safety Canada, and the rest of the national security and intelligence community, on steps to infuse transparency into Canada’s national security policies, programs, and activities in a manner that will increase democratic accountability and public awareness.

Throughout our consultations in the past three years, we frequently heard about the trust gap between the country’s national security institutions and Canadians, and in particular with racialized Canadians. This matters: it is essential, in a healthy liberal democracy, for everyone to trust government and its agencies designed to keep us safe. In this context, we decided to focus our third report on the issue of relations between national security and intelligence institutions and racialized communities.

We believe that a broad approach to transparency is essential in general – and in particular in national security and intelligence institutions’ relations with racialized communities. At times, these relations have been marred by mistrust and suspicion, and by errors of judgement by these institutions, which impacted communities have perceived as discriminatory.

We make a number of recommendations in this report on how national security and intelligence institutions can be more transparent in their engagement with racialized communities. Engagement can help government understand specific needs, identify local voices, open and build dialogue with them, and build trust and a shared understanding of common challenges. Engagement also provides a bridging function: engagement programs work on behalf of multiple parts of the government, exchanging information with external stakeholders and bringing it back inside the government to – ideally – feed into policy and operational processes.

Engagement with racialized communities needs to involve a two-way conversation. As we heard in our consultations, too often engagement involves, in practice, government officials offloading a prepared message and failing to listen to the concerns of stakeholders. Constructive engagement should instead be based on dialogue; government officials should be attuned to the questions and concerns of stakeholders, listen to them, and be prepared and willing to respond.

More and better engagement with racialized communities is essential. But for such engagement to be feasible, our outreach sessions made clear that deeper structural challenges in national security and intelligence institutions must be addressed. As such, our report also offers recommendations on these broader issues, notably on how to enhance diversity and inclusion and how to make complaints mechanisms more accessible to racialized and other vulnerable groups.

As digitization accelerates, the data-driven dimensions of national security continue to expand at exponential rates. As a result, the national security apparatus is becoming more dependent on algorithmic methodologies and digital tools to gather and process massive data holdings, a reality that the Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated. It is clear, however, that systemic biases in Artificial Intelligence (AI) design can have perverse impacts on vulnerable individuals or groups of individuals, notably racialized communities. These biases reflect not only specific flaws in AI programs and organizations using them, but also underlying societal cleavages and inequalities which are then reinforced and potentially deepened.

AI that poses a threat to racialized communities further erodes trust in national security and intelligence agencies and prohibits effective relationship building.

There is growing agreement that many aspects of openness, oversight, and engagement play a vital role in ensuring accountability and effectiveness in current and future AI deployments.

Among other recommendations, we suggest in this report that as part of their regular transparency reporting (a key recommendation in our second report), all national security agencies should provide details of their AI activities as well as their efforts to mitigate unintended consequences and systemic biases within such systems.

In light of the growing attention paid to AI use in government and industry, there can be no excuse for inaction by national security and intelligence institutions in terms of seeking greater openness and transparency and in working more collaboratively with stakeholder communities. The relationship between transparency and trust is complex and fraught with risks, in general and especially in the realms of national security and digitization. The counter-risks, however, stemming from opacity and insularity are much greater. There is an opportunity to be both proactive and thoughtful in proceeding down this path, and there is a need to do so with greater sensitivity to those communities who have good reason to be suspicious in light of historical biases and missteps that governments now recognize and seek to address.

We recognize that our brief examination of AI systems within the context of relations with racialized communities is just one facet of this increasingly important and evermore strategic lens of national security transparency. As such, our next report will examine the wider implications of digitization for the governance of the national security community.

1. Introduction

Throughout our consultations in the past three years, we frequently heard about the trust gap between the country’s national security institutions and Canadians, and in particular with racialized Canadians. This matters: it is essential, in a healthy liberal democracy, for everyone to trust government and its agencies designed to keep us safe.

One of the overarching goals of national security is the protection of Canadian values, including the preservation of a pluralist society where inclusion and respect for diversity foster a strong sense of belonging. As such, respect for commonly understood liberal values must be inherent to interactions between national security agencies and the communities with which they engage.

In this context, we decided to focus our third report on the issue of relations between national security and intelligence institutions and racialized communities. Over eight sessions between August 2021 and February 2022, we sought to better understand how these institutions engage with racialized communities.

In this report, we provide recommendations on how such engagement can be improved, with the objective of building trust between national security and intelligence institutions and racialized communities in Canada – a trust which is often fragile and, in some cases, broken. We start by focusing on engagement itself, and follow with suggestions for broader structural reforms. This report also includes an annex detailing Canada’s engagement activities, as well as those of some of our allies.

2. Relations with Racialized Communities

Transparency can mean different things to different people. As we discussed in our second report, released in November 2021, transparency can be interpreted in a narrow and passive way, referring to a decision by the government to release, or withhold, certain information or data. In that report, we strongly encouraged national security and intelligence institutions to reject such an approach. Instead, we recommended a broader and more proactive approach, based on recognizing the importance of exchanges between the government and Canadians. According to such a view, national security and intelligence institutions have both the responsibility to be, and an interest in being, open. Under such an approach, openness extends beyond the one-way flow of information and data to include engagement where dialogue with Canadians is continuous (and not only at times of crises), dynamic (and not unidirectional), and comprehensive.

The NS-TAG believes that such a broad approach to transparency is essential in general – and in particular in national security and intelligence institutions’ relations with racialized communities. At times, these relations have been marred by mistrust and suspicion, and by errors of judgement by these institutions, which impacted communities have perceived as discriminatory. In this context, we decided to focus our third report on providing recommendations on how national security and intelligence institutions can better engage with racialized groups in Canada.

2.1 What is community engagement?

Engagement can take different forms depending on the desired goal. At its simplest, engagement can consist of the sharing of information with communities or stakeholders to help them understand an issue and potential solutions. Other models involve more collaboration and direct outreach to communities or other stakeholders, offering a forum in which information can be exchanged and trust can be built. At its most complex, communities and stakeholders are empowered to contribute to the pursuit of solutions to policy issues.

Engagement plays an essential role in helping to share knowledge between national security and intelligence institutions and various communities; without effective engagement, building trust is impossible. Engagement programs provide a bridging function: these programs engage on behalf of multiple parts of the government, exchanging information with external stakeholders and bringing it back inside the government to – ideally – feed into policy and operational processes. Engagement can help government understand specific needs, identify local voices, open and build dialogue with them, and build trust and a shared understanding of common challenges.

National security and intelligence institutions in Canada have established a range of engagement programs, including the Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement branch within the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence within Public Safety Canada, and the Canada Centre for Cyber Security within the Communications Security Establishment (CSE; see annex for more detail). Most of these programs are relatively recent. Their emergence represents some progress, but we believe that more still needs to be done.

As many of our speakers – from government and civil society – emphasized, the purposes of engagement are not transparent: who is engaged, why, with what objectives? What safeguards or firewalls exist to separate engagement from intelligence collection? How many groups receive invitations, how many reply positively? What is achieved with these sessions, and how is success defined and measured? How frequent is follow-up? What have been the main lessons learned from these engagement efforts, and how have they been implemented? Have policies changed as a result? Who does the engagement from within national security institutions (how are they hired and trained, what skills do they possess, are they diverse)? How do they engage with stakeholders from racialized communities (e.g., do they contact them by phone, email, or personal visits)?

Simply put, national security and intelligence institutions need to stop perceiving engagement as an end goal but rather as a valuable means towards the broader objective of building mutual trust. By participating in such engagement activities, racialized communities can also themselves gain a better understanding of the mission and objectives of national security and intelligence institutions.

To be effective, engagement needs to start at the top and to be embedded into the culture of an organization. Engagement starts by building relationships; we heard during our consultations about the importance for national security and intelligence institutions to develop the right skills to conduct meaningful engagement. For what are traditionally secretive organizations, this has not been a priority. Managing engagement activities requires, among other skills, an open mindset, effective communications skills, empathy, and the ability to learn about other cultures.

Building effective engagement programs is complex and cannot follow a one-size-fits-all model. It calls for acquiring a detailed understanding of the needs of specific communities and of their dynamics, past experiences, and concerns. Without a clear understanding of the key drivers of the mistrust that is prevalent in communities, of their perceptions of the government, engagement activities cannot succeed. National security agencies often do not have this knowledge internally; by supporting external research, they can acquire the necessary knowledge while, at the same time, building bridges with the research community. Building such knowledge is especially important to know who to reach out to: engagement activities must be able to identify local leaders who have the credibility and networks necessary to help draw their constituents into productive conversations.

To be successful, engagement needs to be sustained over time; it needs to be pro-active, not reactive. Otherwise, short term, reactive engagement will not only fail to build trust, but might even be counter-productive: it will reinforce negative perceptions and prevent national security institutions to take accountability for mistakes of the past. Proactive, sustained engagement, on the other hand, will better support the building of mutual trust and the demystification of the role of these institutions.

The CSIS Public Report for 2020 mentions that the Service has invested significant effort in building relationships with individuals, communities, and community leaders to establish and sustain trust.^{Footnote 1} The report further mentions that CSIS’s ongoing offer of support and commitment to work in partnership with these communities is not only good practice but serves to protect individuals from intimidation or other hostile activities by foreign state actors. While this is true in theory, in practice the community engagement examples in this report are with the Iranian-Canadian community after the of the tragic downing of flight PS752 in January 2020 and with the Muslim community following the tragic Toronto mosque attack. Such engagement was important, but it was prompted by specific incidents. In our view, CSIS will not succeed in building long-term trust with racialized communities as long as its engagement is primarily reactive.

Similarly, engagement with racialized communities needs to involve a two-way conversation. As we heard in our consultations, too often engagement efforts involve, in practice, government officials offloading a prepared message and failing to listen to the concerns of stakeholders. Constructive engagement should instead be based on dialogue; government officials should be attuned to the questions and concerns of stakeholders, listen to them, and be prepared and willing to respond. These cannot be scripted conversations with talking points and standard responses.

This is essential to better understand and meet the needs of Canada’s diverse racialized communities. Grassroots initiatives provide a distinctive approach to establish a strong foundation of trust with diverse communities. These are the initiatives that bring sustainability to community engagement and help build relationships that can be maintained and strengthened over time. Implementing grassroots efforts is labour intensive; there is, as such, a need to invest time and human resources. A model such as the one proposed by the IAP2 (the International Association for Public Participation) can be useful to help connect national security and intelligence agencies with communities that have never or rarely reached out to in the past.^{Footnote 2} National security agencies must ensure that they create a safe place for these communities to come forward and discuss their concerns.

A common perception among racialized communities is that engagement is largely viewed as a “box to tick” exercise inside national security institutions, and that reports based on the conversations in those activities are shelved afterwards. The onus here is on national security institutions to be transparent and to convince stakeholders that this is not the case.

This improves ownership of the process and reduces tokenization. Moreover, many racialized communities may originate from countries where interactions with national security and intelligence services can result in dire consequences; approaching these communities requires customized care.

In sum, engagement initiatives with racialized communities come with a certain level of unavoidable risk: they can backfire, in particular, if they are poorly designed or implemented. Fortunately, these risks can be mitigated if a proper approach is adopted and efforts are genuine rather than performative. National security and intelligence institutions will make significant strides when they approach community engagement with a clear understanding that racialized communities are often the targets of hate crime, that the fear of foreign interference is frequently strong, and that there might be ongoing intra-community conflicts related to national security.

2.2 The impact of operations on engagement

It is also essential that those being engaged be confident about this. When groups perceive (and this is a common perception) that engagement efforts in fact disguise surveillance or collection activities, they will refuse to fully engage; in the long term, this hinders the development of a relationship based on trust. The onus is on national security institutions to be transparent on this.

It can be difficult for members of the public to distinguish between engagement activities by national security institutions and intelligence-gathering operations. The use of firewalls between these two functions is therefore critical. A good example of this confusion is illustrated by the practice of street checks: while the RCMP has acknowledged the disproportionate harm that this practice has had on marginalized communities, RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki has validated the practice as a valuable tool to gather information. This approach, which privileges information-gathering through a practice that alienates racialized communities, presents a significant challenge to establishing meaningful trust.

Another example of operational practices that can undermine relations between racialized communities and national security agencies are those of CSIS. Nader Hasan, a criminal and constitutional lawyer and adjunct professor, told us of his experience assisting Muslim students who were approached by CSIS, and we find it disturbing to hear that in some cases CSIS officers have discouraged the people they approach from obtaining legal counsel. As a result, he and another professor at the University of Toronto established a hotline to provide pro bono legal advice to students approached by CSIS. When we asked CSIS Director David Vigneault about those allegations, he indicated that this is against policy and that there are “additional safeguards” in place.^{Footnote 3} Regrettably, however, these perceptions remain common.

This way, members of racialized communities have a clear understanding of how they might be approached by officers and agents, their legal rights in those circumstances, and how they can report misconduct.

2.3 Localized engagement and learning through inter-jurisdictional partnerships

Through our consultations, we have learned about the importance of localized engagement with communities and stakeholders – be they civic associations, faith-based organizations, volunteer groups, or others. At the same time, there are inherent challenges for federal organizations to undertake effective outreach. We note, however, that federal entities such as the RCMP and CSIS are investing into community outreach across both policing and security realms.

This includes engagement with municipal government entities that are on the frontline of anti-racism initiatives.

The City of Toronto’s Police Services Board, for example, has sought to expand its community engagement efforts through both in-person and online mechanisms, while Toronto’s Municipal Council has overseen the development of an extensive anti-racism strategy specifically aimed at the Black Community. One of the important recommendations of this strategy, endorsed by the mayor, is to “mandate the collection and public reporting of race-based data for greater transparency.”^{Footnote 4} This recommendation is aligned with the Government of Canada’s anti-racism strategy released in 2019, as well as our own recommendations in this report in terms of making race an important lens for national security data collection, analysis, and reporting.

Other cities are making similar investments. The City of London, Ontario, for example, has undertaken efforts to strengthen relations with the Muslim Community, creating a Muslim Community Liaison Advisor. This effort, derived from the City’s response to the 2021 attack on a Muslim family which killed four and injured one, also has national security ramifications, as we learned from the dark web activities of the accused as well as the inter-jurisdictional partnerships enjoining municipal, provincial, and federal entities that ensued during the investigation.

The importance of cultivating more proactive local partnerships has also been a priority for the New Zealand government in terms of its own Muslim community outreach in the aftermath of the 2019 Christchurch tragic attack on a mosque that led to 51 deaths. The subsequent public inquiry led to an effort to better integrate multicultural policies and relations-building within the national security apparatus. To quote from the New Zealand government’s Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet:^{Footnote 5}

Enduring partnerships between government and communities, Māori, civil society, academia, local government, and the private sector are essential to effectively counter terrorism and violent extremism, strengthen national security and foster social inclusion.

Given that local governments and other local bodies such as police services and immigration settlement agencies are on the front line of community relations (especially in urbanized environments):

This partnership mentality could also be deployed in a more proactive sense with racialized communities who not only harbor high levels of mistrust toward governments but also may not distinguish between various elements of public sector policing and national security institutions that often encompass different jurisdictions. Seeking efforts to improve the engagement interface between racialized communities and national security and intelligence institutions through partnerships with local governmental organizations that have already invested significantly into developing such relationships could provide a basis for improved dialogue.

3. Governance

More and better engagement with racialized communities is essential. But for such engagement to be feasible, our outreach sessions over the previous eight months made clear that deeper structural challenges in national security and intelligence institutions must be addressed. As such, in this section we offer recommendations to address these broader issues.

3.1 Diversity and inclusion

Despite recent improvements, racialized Canadians are still underrepresented in national security and intelligence institutions, especially at senior levels.^{Footnote 6} This has important consequences: it impedes cultural awareness, for example, damaging relations with communities, and hurts innovation. Representation at all levels matters. It matters to the racialized communities institutions engage with, and it matters to the learning culture of the institutions themselves.

Disaggregated data allows these institutions to make decisions on where they need to improve hiring and recruitment. National security institutions should reflect the demographic makeup of Canadian society; while we are not calling for quotas, there needs to be more clarity on who is hired. We also recommend that institutions include the demographics of applicant pools, which can be indicative of where more work needs to be done. Importantly, such data should also include reporting on retention. Exit interviews with racialized individuals, notably, can be revealing of where challenges still exist.

Changing the culture of large organizations is complex and faces natural resistance. It calls for a systemic approach along a broad continuum including recruitment, training, promotions and rewards, how to deal with inappropriate behavior, and how to create a safe environment for difficult in-house discussions. Efforts by national security and intelligence institutions to embrace diversity and inclusion should be value and outcome-driven, and not a discrete project. This means hardwiring a diverse and inclusive culture starting on the first day after employees are hired, including how they are trained, how they work, and how they are promoted and rewarded.

3.2 Complaints mechanisms

During our eight sessions working on this report, we frequently heard about the need for greater transparency, clarity, ease of access, and simplicity for existing complaints mechanisms. Individuals from racialized communities who wish to complain about actions by national security agencies, in particular, face complex and obscure processes which they may struggle to navigate. Too often, they do not know what the proper mechanisms for recourse are, and even when they do, these are often complex. This is especially unfair for members of historically disadvantaged groups. For newcomer Canadians, there may, moreover, be language barriers. It is not an even playing field when marginalized groups try to hold the government to account.

The access to information (ATI) process provides an apt illustration here. The ATI process should offer one recourse, among others, for Canadians to hold national security and intelligence institutions to account. Yet the process is excessively slow, and it can be particularly difficult to navigate for marginalized groups who may lack the necessary resources. This prevents them from using this recourse, and further erodes trust.

This link needs, crucially, to be clear and visible. The look and feel of this link should also be standardized across websites.

This site could also include the expected time of response and the recourse for those unsatisfied with the response.

4. Artificial Intelligence

Engagement often relies on digital technology. This raises concerns and considerations that we can only touch on briefly here. As digitization accelerates, the data-driven dimensions of national security continue to expand at exponential rates. As a result, the national security apparatus is becoming more dependent on algorithmic methodologies and digital tools to gather and process massive data holdings. In doing so, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has emerged as an important and expanding dimension of security and intelligence operations.

The OECD defines an AI system as a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations, or decisions influencing real or virtual environments.^{Footnote 7} Predictive analytics and decision support systems (one of seven potential AI use cases identified by the OECD) have become critical elements of national security and intelligence capacities, a reality that the pandemic has accelerated. Border and immigration services as well as intelligence gathering and analysis are prominent examples, a reality confirmed to us by key organizations during our work preparing this report.

As one leading AI expert explained to us, there are three types of harm that can potentially stem from the design and deployment of AI systems: intended, unintended, and systemic. Intended harm can reflect militaristic endeavours, or a range of cyber-intrusions or even intelligence gathering exercises with disruptive or offensive objectives. Unintended harm often reflects algorithmic design flaws (often not foreseen in advance) that can have perverse impacts on individuals or groups of individuals; one frequently cited example is a financial institution that deploys an AI program that inadvertently excludes more individuals from a racialized minority.

Systemic harm is often closely related to unintended harm, but the scale is often wider and the problems more deep-rooted and difficult to rectify. Here, for example, a deficiency of socio-ethnic diversity within the AI design community itself can lead to systemic biases in algorithms that reflect not only specific flaws in AI programs and organizations using them, but also underlying societal cleavages and inequalities which are then reinforced and potentially deepened. As the national security community seeks to expand its reliance on AI systems across a range of programs and services, recognizing all three types of harm are important – while the potential for systemic harm is one that directly ties AI systems and impacts with the focus of this report.

CBSA is a particularly interesting case study in this regard. A recent CBC article characterized its widening digital lens and data-driven focus in the following manner:^{Footnote 8}

The agency wants to increase its use of data analytics to help officers distinguish between low-risk individuals who cross the border frequently and those who pose a higher risk. It is also hoping that data analytics can help it detect trends and patterns that can help officers flag people who might be smuggling drugs or guns into Canada.

In this article, a CBSA executive is quoted as saying that the pandemic has enabled the agency to greatly accelerate digital strategies and break through “glass ceilings” that were in the way prior to Covid-19. In our own consultations, CBSA’s president specifically cited systemic biases of AI systems as one of his primary concerns about this digital evolution – as well as the importance of ensuring appropriate safeguards to mitigate such risks as a priority going forward.

This point is germane to the topic of this report, as such biases are especially impactful on racialized communities. In early 2022, a group of US Senators, for example, called upon US federal entities to abandon their use of Clearview Technologies (an American company specializing in AI tools and programs, notably facial recognition methodologies), citing a “threat to Black Communities.”^{Footnote 9} In Canada, the RCMP’s past use of Clearview technologies has also been controversial – and a source of disagreement with the Privacy Commissioner (as explained below).

In sum, AI that poses a threat to racialized communities further erodes trust in national security and intelligence agencies and prohibits effective relationship building through the sorts of engagement activities that we discuss in this report.

4.1 Guiding principles

Within such a context, there is growing agreement that many aspects of openness, oversight, and engagement play a vital role in ensuring accountability and effectiveness in any current or future AI deployments. The Government of Canada has sought to make openness and transparency centerpieces of its five principles underpinning its AI strategy:^{Footnote 10}

• understand and measure the impact of using AI by developing and sharing tools and approaches;
• be transparent about how and when we are using AI, starting with a clear user need and public benefit;
• provide meaningful explanations about AI decision making, while also offering opportunities to review results and challenge these decisions;
• be as open as we can by sharing source code, training data, and other relevant information, all while protecting personal information, system integration, and national security and defence; and,
• provide sufficient training so that government employees developing and using AI solutions have the responsible design, function, and implementation skills needed to make AI-based public services better.

The NATO framework discusses the underlying justification for each of these principles in some detail.^{Footnote 11}

In committing to these principles, we endorse two key recommendations from a recent report issued jointly by the Information and Privacy Commissioners of BC and Yukon examining the implications of AI for government use and services:^{Footnote 12}

• The need for public bodies to commit to guiding principles for the use of AI that incorporate transparency, accountability, legality, procedural fairness, and protection of privacy. These principles should apply to all existing and new programs or activities, be included in any tendering documents by public authorities for third-party contracts or AI systems delivered by service providers, and be used to assess legacy projects so they are brought into compliance within a reasonable timeframe.
• The need for government to promote capacity-building, co-operation, and public engagement on AI. This should be carried out through public education initiatives, building subject-matter knowledge and expertise on AI across government ministries, developing capacity to support knowledge sharing and expertise between government and AI developers and vendors, and establishing or growing the capacity to develop open-source, high-quality data sets for training and testing such systems.

4.2 Openness, oversight, and legal recourse

The RCMP’s use of Clearview led to a fundamental disagreement between the agency and the federal Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC). On the one hand, the RCMP was at fault for initially having denied use of Clearview facial recognition programs and for a lack of preparation in deploying such tools. On the other hand, the RCMP denied that in doing so it had violated Canadian privacy law. One analysis summarizes the case in this manner:^{Footnote 13}

The RCMP did not agree that they violated section 4 of the Privacy Act. In fact, they argued that under the Act, they do not have a duty to ensure legal compliance of private third parties like Clearview. However, they did agree to OPC’s recommendations in an effort to improve operations.

Soon after the OPC launched their RCMP investigation, the RCMP internally worked to address some of the issues. They restricted their use of Clearview and started the “National Technology Onboarding Program” to look into how novel investigative techniques comply with the Privacy Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As of July 2020, Clearview stopped offering its services to Canada, and the RCMP stopped using it altogether.

In light of this report, the OPC published the “Draft privacy guidance on facial recognition for police agencies” (“the Draft”) to provide provincial, regional, federal, and municipal police agencies with more detailed privacy compliance information. The guide offers a privacy framework with various related lawful authority guidance, and data management related to collection, retention, security, transparency, accountability, and more.^{Footnote 14}

What is encouraging about this case is the development of proactive guidelines by the Commissioner as well as efforts by the RCMP to improve its operational readiness for such efforts, through the creation of the National Technology Onboarding Program. The RCMP, however, has failed to provide the public with any substantial information about this program, aside from the six guiding principles that were shared with the NS-TAG in March 2021, including how racial bias in artificial intelligence will be evaluated when considering the deployment of new technologies.^{Footnote 15}

Examining the Clearview case and other examples like it in Canada and elsewhere, the Information and Privacy Commissioners of BC and the Yukon further underscore and highlight the centrality of transparency in using of algorithmic governance:^{Footnote 16}

Transparency is critical to the effective governance of automated systems. Policymakers need to articulate the range of data that could be made available about such systems, even proprietary, closed-source systems that are protected by trade secrets.

At minimum, those responsible for an automated system should be required to disclose that an algorithmic process is taking place, the level and nature of human involvement in this process, the data that is used in training or operating the system, and the algorithmic model and the inferences that it draws.

We also note that the Government of Canada has an established AI Advisory Board that can be helpful in devising appropriate mechanisms and strategies for such oversight and accreditation. In pursuing these avenues, we expect that ethnic and race-based biases will be a central focus, including the development and public release of specific risk mitigation efforts that address concerns raised by the President of the CBSA, among others.

It is also important for national security and intelligence institutions to ensure that legal recourse is available to individuals and parties unfairly or inadvertently impacted by AI systems they deploy. In this regard, there may be some legal uncertainty as to how such provisions can be provided. For example, the joint BC-Yukon report points to a void in the current policy and legislative regime: “Neither the TBS Directive nor Bill C-11 creates enforceable rights for individuals who are adversely impacted by a decision of an automated decision system (ADS), such as an explicit right to appeal the automated decision made against them. Meaningful rights are required to adequately ensure fairness in ADS.”

Here too, the potential for gender and ethnic biases to lead to systemic impacts should be a central concern.

4.3 Proactive engagement and public trust

A recent five country study (United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and Australia) of public attitudes and trust toward AI shows qualified support for its use – with significant concerns surrounding unpredictability of impacts, unintended consequences, and labour market displacement, among others.^{Footnote 17} The study found that roughly two-thirds of citizens across all countries felt that existing regulations and laws were insufficient. Most citizens, therefore, expect proactive efforts to strengthen AI governance. With respect to cultivating public trust, the report outlines determinants that are useful guideposts for governments:

• Trust is central to AI acceptance;
• The strongest driver of trust is believing current regulations and laws are sufficient to ensure AI use is safe;
• The perceived impact of AI on jobs, and familiarity with AI, influence trust;
• The more people believe the impact of AI is uncertain, the less they trust AI systems;
• AI context and education influence trust and acceptance.

This underscores broad themes of this report – in terms of racialized communities that may often have deficient trust in the national security apparatus, with the potential for distrust to grow if untended and systemic harm of AI systems is perceived, or shown in certain instances, to be a reality. The survey’s findings in terms of concerns surrounding surveillance and privacy, coupled with the unintended consequences stemming from systemic biases in AI coding and design, complicate the trust equation for national security institutions. Accordingly, proactive public engagement is essential generally, and in particular with racialized communities.

The Government of Canada’s Public Awareness Working Group, established to provide advice to the Government’s AI Advisory Board, can provide a basis for doing so.^{Footnote 18}

A key dimension of such efforts is AI use and risk mitigation. The prior importance of oversight and legal recourse is one vital aspect of this public education role, but so too are more proactive outreach efforts to nurture dialogue.

4.4 Skills development and training capacities

The development of AI capacities within governments creates skills development challenges in terms of recruitment, retention, and training. At the same time, along with fostering internal capacities, governments may find themselves working more closely with private sector providers.

As we noted in our first report, national security institutions in Canada have not been shy in conveying to us their concerns about skills capacities and competitive pressures with industry. At the same time, the importance of transparency and diversity in hiring practices as it pertains to the focus of this report must remain a paramount concern.

Quite simply, a more diverse AI workforce is likely to be more sensitized to systemic biases.

At the same time, such matters cannot be addressed by diversity in the workforce alone; awareness and competencies must be fostered through training and development. Here, the transparency of training processes and materials is also essential.

4.5 Wider impacts of digitization

In light of the growing attention paid to AI use in government and industry, as well as the policy commitments and specific directives of the Government of Canada in this realm, there can be no excuse for inaction by national security and intelligence institutions in terms of seeking greater openness and transparency on the one hand, and in working more collaboratively, proactively, and inclusively with stakeholder communities on the other hand. The relationship between transparency and trust is complex and fraught with risks, and especially in the realms of national security and digitization.

The counter-risks, however, stemming from opacity and insularity are much greater. National security agencies have little choice but to become more data-driven and technologically sophisticated – a reality the public understands. There is an opportunity to be both proactive and thoughtful in proceeding down this path, and there is a need to do so with greater sensitivity to those communities who have good reason to be suspicious in light of historical biases and missteps that governments now recognize and seek to address.

We also recognize that our admittedly brief examination of AI systems within the context of relations with racialized communities is just one facet of this increasingly important and evermore strategic lens of national security transparency. As such, our next report will examine the wider implications of digitization for the governance of the national security community.

Annex A: Summary of our recommendations

Relations with Racialized Communities

What is community engagement?

• We recommend that national security institutions (especially CSIS, the RCMP and CBSA) develop and publicly release their engagement strategies.
• We recommend that national security and intelligence institutions make more effort to ensure that they can acquire and foster the skills appropriate for meaningful engagement.
• We recommend that national security agencies support more research of the type conducted by the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (CCCEPV) to help them acquire the necessary knowledge while, at the same time, building bridges with the research community.
• We recommend that engagement programs avoid the trap of reaching out to communities only in times of crisis. To be successful, engagement needs to be pro-active, not reactive.
• We recommend that Canada’s national security and intelligence institutions ensure that they reach out not only at the level of community leaders, but also at the grassroots level.
• We strongly recommend that the outcome of engagement activities be actively integrated into policy making and operational processes.
• National security and intelligence institutions need to clearly inform racialized communities on how engagement feeds into their decision-making processes.

The impact of operations on engagement

• It is essential that there be a strong firewall between engagement activities and intelligence collection efforts.
• We recommend that national intelligence institution provide accessible information on how they conduct engagement activities.

Localized engagement and learning through inter-jurisdictional partnerships

• We recommend that national security and intelligence institutions aim to be more visible and proactive in developing engagement mechanisms with local stakeholders.
• We recommend that national security and intelligence institutions invest more time to learn from various local initiatives.

Governance

Diversity and inclusion

• We recommend that national security organizations not only continue and intensify their efforts to diversify their human resources, but also that they be more transparent on issues such as data about employment and existing barriers for racialized individuals.

Complaints mechanisms

• We recommend that national security and intelligence institutions add a link to their complaints processes on their webpage.
• We recommend that the government consider setting up a simple, one-stop shop to explain how to initiate a complaint.

Artificial Intelligence

Guiding principles

• We recommend that national security and intelligence agencies commit to adopting NATO’s 2021 framework, including the following six principles crafted for the responsible usage of defence and security AI deployments: lawfulness; responsibility and accountability; explainability and traceability; reliability; governability; and bias mitigation.

Openness, oversight, and legal recourse

• We recommend that all national security agencies provide details of their AI activities as well as their efforts to mitigate unintended consequences and systemic biases within such systems.
• We recommend that Public Safety Canada establish an external body to provide independent advice on algorithmic systems.
• We recommend that any new oversight body established for CBSA as well as existing oversight bodies (notably NSIRA and NSICOP) consider examining the suitability of recourse mechanisms on AI-related matters.

Proactive engagement and public trust

• We recommend that public engagement efforts pertaining to AI be expanded and deepened.
• We recommend that the active involvement of members from racialized communities in advisory mechanisms for upfront design and mechanisms for evaluation and learning be viewed as a priority.

Skills development and training capacities

• In pursuing AI skills and in selecting private partners for AI systems, we strongly recommend that an EDI (equity, diversity and inclusion) criterion be adopted as a central lens for human resources planning.
• We recommend that our observations above regarding training capacities that address the potential impact on racialized communities be explicitly applied in the realm of AI readiness and management.

Annex B: Overview of NS-TAG Meetings from May 2021 to February 2022

Regular Meeting – May 12, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic:

“Connecting with Diverse Communities: Enhancing How National Security Organizations Engage, Build Trust, and Evaluate Success – Part One”

Discussion with guests from the National Security Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and the RCMP on the NSICOP Study of Diversity and Inclusion in the Security and Intelligence Community, the use of Clearview Artificial Intelligence (AI) by the RCMP and the challenges that it presented, and the newly formed National Technologies On Boarding Program (NTOP).

Regular Meeting – June 9, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic:

“Connecting with Diverse Communities: Enhancing How National Security Organizations Engage, Build Trust, and Evaluate Success – Part Two”

Discussion with the Deputy Minister of Public Safety on the NS-TAG’s second report. Discussion with guests focused on racial profiling, systemic discrimination, and racism within the national security community, as well as ways in which they can gain public trust. Guests presented the report from the University of Toronto’s Institute for Islamic Studies and the National Council of Canadian Muslims titled Under Layered Suspicion.

Special Meeting – August 30, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic:

Discussion with the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

The NS-TAG welcomed the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the RCMP's Associate Chief Human Resources Officer. Opening remarks and responses to members’ questions covered a number of topics including: transparency and accountability initiatives and milestones, community outreach and engagement, oversight and review agencies, and efforts to update national security training.

Regular Meeting – September 29, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic:

“Connecting with Diverse Communities: Enhancing How National Security Organizations Engage, Build Trust, and Evaluate Success – Part Three”

The NS-TAG welcomed the Director General of Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement at CSIS and the Deputy Chief Executive National Security of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in New Zealand. The discussion sessions with guests focused on the work of the Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement team at CSIS and the current challenges faced by the service regarding stakeholder engagement, as well as the main conclusions of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques on March 15, 2019.

Regular Meeting – October 27, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic:

“Connecting with Diverse Communities: Enhancing How National Security Organizations Engage, Build Trust, and Evaluate Success – Part Four”

Guest speakers from the Chinese Canadian National Council for Social Justice, the BC Civil Liberties Association, the World Sikh Organization of Canada and AlMaghrib Canada discussed their work and experience in engaging with various communities, their perspectives on how national security organizations should build trust with diverse communities, as well as ways to combat racism.

Regular Meeting – November 10, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic:

“Connecting with Diverse Communities: Enhancing How National Security Organizations Engage, Build Trust, and Evaluate Success – Part Five”

The NS-TAG welcomed guests from Stockwoods LLP and the Brennan Center for Justice. During the discussion, participants questioned the threat algorithm that CSIS uses, the need for increased accountability mechanisms within the organization, as well as the steps it must take in order to build trust with Muslim communities. Speakers also advised on how national security agencies can enhance transparency by reporting relevant information in an accessible and comprehensible manner, and improving outreach by consciously interacting with communities in a way to ensure they are not viewed or treated as security threats.

Special Meeting – December 8, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic:

“Connecting with Diverse Communities: Enhancing How National Security Organizations Engage, Build Trust, and Evaluate Success – Part Six”

The guest speaker from the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence shared information on how they have worked with third parties, such as academics, community-based practitioners, and civil society organizations, to engage with various communities, stakeholders, and sectors that are relevant to them. The President of the CBSA provided opening remarks on the organization’s priorities, role, and key initiatives, and answered questions from members that covered a number of topics, including: the CBSA's review body and the complaints mechanism, challenges with emerging technologies and AI, and operational policies and transparency.

Regular Meeting – January 26, 2022, Virtual

Theme/Topic:

“Connecting with Diverse Communities: Enhancing How National Security Organizations Engage, Build Trust, and Evaluate Success – Part Seven”

Discussion with guest from Digital Public Square on the importance of trust between communities and federal institutions, the significance of deploying local information campaigns, and how to capitalize on digital technology.

Regular Meeting – February 23, 2022, Virtual

Theme/Topic:

“Connecting with Diverse Communities: Enhancing How National Security Organizations Engage, Build Trust, and Evaluate Success – Part Eight”

Members and guests from the Responsible AI Institute and the Centre on Hate, Bias and Extremism at the Ontario Tech University exchanged views on the importance of how AI can contribute to transparency, enhancing public trust and how it can empower both people and businesses, the impacts of over-policing, under-policing and how the disparity in policing is particularly seen in different movements. They also emphasized the importance of sharing intelligence, continuing proactive engagement and transparency, and being a proactive presence within the communities.

List of Guest Speakers Who Participated in the NS-TAG Meetings:

• Navaid Aziz, Director of Public Relations, AIMaghrib Canada
• Alain Babineau, Expert in Racial and Social Profiling at the City of Montreal, former RCMP Officer
• Balpreet Singh Boparai, Legal Counsel, World Sikh Organization of Canada (WSO)
• Paul Boudreau, Executive Director of Technical Operations, Specialized Policing Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
• Ashley Casovan, Executive Director, Responsible AI Institute
• Dr. Anver Emon, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, University of Toronto
• Amy Go, President of the Chinese Canadian National Council for Social Justice (CCNC-SJ)
• Nader Hasan, Lawyer, Stockwoods LLP
• Brett Kubicek, Acting Senior Director of the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (the Canada Centre)
• Farhaan Ladhani, CEO and co-founder of Digital Public Square (DPS)
• Stéphanie Le Saux-Farmer, Analyst, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP)
• Brenda Lucki, Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
• Tony Lynch, Deputy Chief Executive National Security, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, New Zealand
• Meghan McDermott, Policy Director, BC Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA)
• John Ossowski, President of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
• René Ouellette, Director General of Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement, CSIS
• Faiza Patel, Director, Liberty and National Security, Brennan Center for Justice
• Barbara Perry, Director, Centre on Hate, Bias and Extremism, Ontario Tech University

Annex C: Canadian and International National Security Engagement Activities and Best Practices

Summary

This annex provides an overview of the key practices and initiatives that the core Canadian national security departments and agencies, as well some other countries, are conducting to engage minority or marginalized communities. This annex also presents key recommendations and best practices on engaging with marginalized communities emanating from non-governmental or international organizations. This annex defines ‘minority or marginalized communities’ as: racialized communities, religious minorities, LGBTIQ2+ peoples, peoples with disabilities, neuro-diverse peoples, women, and youth.

The following content focuses on four main categories:

Engagement Activities

These are activities that allow for interaction between department or agency employees and marginalized communities for the purposes of imparting information, offering training services, or gathering feedback on department or agency activities.

Communication Activities

These are activities in which there is one-way communication on the part of the department or agency towards marginalized communities for the purpose of informing them about key issues, initiatives, mandates, policies or programs, or communicating department or agency values.

Past Practices

These include efforts to provide diverse lenses on the department or agency’s work through the creation of secretariats, public displays of support for diverse Canadian communities, or disclosures and apologies for past wrongdoings perpetrated by the department or agency.

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

These include attempts to present employment opportunities to new demographics whether by age, gender identity, race, religious expression, sexual orientation, and physical or neuro ability. It can also be understood as any action done to provide support to employees who identify as a member of a minority or marginalized community, and thus contribute to higher retention levels.

The findings are presented in three sections. The first section reflects the activities of the core national security departments and agencies in Canada. The compilation was conducted exclusively using information found on each department and agency’s websites, and thus, may not be all-inclusive. The second section reflects the activities of selected countries. It includes information found on the Internet and available in English or French, and as such, may not reflect the full scope of the activities conducted by each country. The third and last section presents recommendations and best practices that a number of non-governmental or international organizations have offered to various national security institutions to enhance their engagement and communication efforts.

Engagement Activities of the Core National Security Departments and Agencies in Canada

Overarching Commitments of the Government of Canada

• National Security Transparency Commitment, which is a commitment “to enable democratic accountability [in the national security sphere] without providing information that could compromise Canada’s security or the safety of Canadians.”^{Footnote 19}
• Call to Action on Anti-Racism, Equity and Inclusion in the Federal Public Service, which states that the Federal Public Service is called to support the voices of marginalized groups, create opportunities for marginalized citizens within federal organizations, and take practical actions to invoke change.^{Footnote 20}
• Accessibility Strategy for the Public Service of Canada, which is a strategy to become the most accessible and inclusive public service on the world.^{Footnote 21}
• Official Languages Act, which is a federal statute that requires all federal institutions to provide services in English or French upon request.^{Footnote 22}
• The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which sets out the rights and freedoms that Canadians believe are necessary in a free and democratic society.^{Footnote 23}
• The Canadian Human Rights Act, which is a statute that ensures equal opportunity to individuals who may face discriminatory practices on a set of prohibited grounds.^{Footnote 24}
• The Employment Equity Act, which is meant to achieve equality in the workplace by endorsing equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment.^{Footnote 25}
• The Pay Equity Act, which is meant to address gender-based discrimination in the pay practices and systems of employers.^{Footnote 26}
• The Canadian Multiculturalism Act, which seeks to eradicate and overcome discrimination and eliminate any obstacles that prevent full participation in society.^{Footnote 27}

Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

Engagement Activities

• CBSA staff participated in Indigenous community Powwows.^{Footnote 28}
• Conducted 62 outreach and recruitment events geared towards Indigenous communities in 2019.^{Footnote 29}

Communication Activities

• June 2020, President of CBSA made a public statement announcing that a CBSA employee was dismissed after posting a racially offensive video on social media.^{Footnote 30}
• Has a YouTube channel that has videos informing people on: imports and exports, Cannabis, and the diverse workforce of CBSA.^{Footnote 31}

Past Practices

• Partnered with the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne in October 2018 to add the Mohawk language to the signage at the Cornwall Port of Entry.^{Footnote 32}
• Created the Indigenous Affairs Secretariat to provide an Indigenous lens on how the Agency’s engagement activities, policies, operations, and people affect Indigenous communities.^{Footnote 33}
• Reviews demographic data and diversity information as part of its executive talent management process.^{Footnote 34}
• CBSA employees who work at the Cornwall Port of Entry take a two-day course that was co-developed by the Agency and the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne to enhance relationships between CBSA and the Indigenous people of Akwesasne.^{Footnote 35}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

• Currently launching the Employment Equity, Diversity and Inclusion Action Plan for 2020-2023, which articulates strategies, measures, and the resources necessary to successfully recruit, promote, and retain a more diverse workforce.^{Footnote 36}
• CBSA agents from Vancouver National Airport have been conducting outreach and recruitment among Indigenous peoples.^{Footnote 37}
• Implemented the Indigenous Mentorship Program, in which CBSA employees from across Canada are paired with a mentor.^{Footnote 38}
• Created the Indigenous Advisory Circle, which provides advice and guidance on Indigenous recruitment, retention, training, and advancement.^{Footnote 39}
• Participates in the Young Women in Public Safety Initiative.^{Footnote 40}
• Participates in the Indigenous Youth Summer Employment Opportunity Program.^{Footnote 41}

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

Engagement Activities

• In 2018, RCMP officers in the hate crime division in BC visited mosques and prayer centres and engaged with the members of the congregation, encouraging them to report any acts of hate they experience.^{Footnote 42}
• In April 2021, RCMP officers in Alberta took part in the observance of Ramadan at the Akram Jomaa mosque.^{Footnote 43}
• RCMP Sergeant organized a healing camp targeting addiction and social issues in an Indigenous community in Manitoba.^{Footnote 44}
• RCMP officers in Alberta take part in the Rediscover Camp, organized by the Old Massett First Nation in BC. Here, officers spend time with First Nation youth in the wilderness, attending fire circles, and connecting with Indigenous history and culture.^{Footnote 45}
• Have been engaging with and surveying Indigenous, Northern, and rural communities to develop solutions reflective of locally identified priorities to build local policing models.^{Footnote 46}

Communication Activities

• June 25th, 2018 RCMP Commissioner made a public statement addressed to the families of the missing and murdered Indigenous women and girls apologizing for the failure of the RCMP in being the police service they needed during that time.^{Footnote 47}
• RCMP in New Brunswick created and published the Indigenous Engagement Strategy of 2020-2021.^{Footnote 48}
• Developed and published the Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion Strategy, which introduced fundamental changes to the RCMP that will promote an inclusive organization that values diversity and serves employees and communities with dignity and respect.^{Footnote 49}
• Has a YouTube account, where they inform the public on topics including domestic violence, peacekeeping missions, and driving under the influence.^{Footnote 50}

Past Practices

• Added a blanket exercise on Indigenous history to the Cadet Training Program in at the RCMP Academy. During this exercise cadets take on the roles of Indigenous peoples in Canada by standing on blankets representing their land. They read cards describing historical events and the blankets are folded until they represent the land Indigenous peoples own today.^{Footnote 51}
• RCMP in NL created the RCMP Black Engagement Steering Committee, which is mandated to guide and inform the Commanding Officer of RCMP NL on concerns of the Black community as well as examining recruitment processes, training, and engagement with the Black community.^{Footnote 52}
• Currently integrating updates to cadet training including courses on GBA+, cultural humility, and anti-racism.^{Footnote 53}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

• Published the Guide to Supporting Transgender, Non-Binary, and Two-Spirit Employees.^{Footnote 54}
• Updated their recruitment application process so that permanent residents who have lived in Canada for 3 of the last 5 years, may apply to be an officer.^{Footnote 55}
• Began enhancing recruitment processes by increasing diversity among recruiters and developing new training so they can effectively recruit a diverse workforce.^{Footnote 56}

Canadian Security And Intelligence Service (CSIS)

Engagement Activities

• After the downing of flight PS752, CSIS conducted outreach with Iranian-Canadian communities to offer support and a commitment to work in partnership to help protect and safeguard individuals from intimidation or hostile activities by foreign state actors.^{Footnote 57}
• Employees participated in class and seminar discussions in over 30 universities in 2020.^{Footnote 58}
• After the Toronto Mosque Attack, CSIS engaged with important leaders in the Muslim community.^{Footnote 59}
• Initiated the Academic Outreach program to engage external experts from a range of backgrounds to understand issues related to Canada’s national security interests.^{Footnote 60}
• Initiated the Stakeholder engagement program to engage with non-governmental, economic, and social organizations.^{Footnote 61}

Communication Activities

• Has a YouTube channel, where they communicate the Director’s Message, videos on the current threat landscape and put up recruitment videos.^{Footnote 62}

Past Practices

• Conducted briefings for external stakeholders in 2020 that covered issues such as national security priorities, as well as mental health, good practices for coping during the global pandemic, and GBA+ initiatives.^{Footnote 63}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

• During their university seminar discussions in 2020, they also held a virtual job fair at all the universities as a proactive recruitment strategy.^{Footnote 64}
• July 2021, released job postings specifically geared toward visible minorities and Indigenous applicants.^{Footnote 65}
• Publishes recruitment videos for different units on their YouTube channel.^{Footnote 66}
• Participates in the Young Women in Public Safety Initiative.^{Footnote 67}

Department of Public Safety (PS)

Engagement Activities

• Launched a national stakeholder engagement process in September 2016, on policing Indigenous communities.^{Footnote 68}
• Held a Symposium on addressing unconscious bias, diversity, and inclusion in national security in 2020 and published a summary of the event entitled, Expert Symposium on Addressing Unconscious Bias, Diversity and Inclusion in National Security.^{Footnote 69}
• Created the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security to engage Canadians and the Government of Canada in a long-term dialogue on matters related to national security.^{Footnote 70}
• Created the Aboriginal Community Safety Planning Initiative, through which Public Safety Canada officials work with communities to support them through the stages of Community Safety Planning engagement, development, and implementation.^{Footnote 71}
• Engaged with youth in their effort to counter violent extremism, during which they provide a better understanding of the risks faced by youth in the online space.^{Footnote 72}
• Took part in engagement events with Muslim Communities throughout Canada, facilitated by the North American Spiritual Revival.^{Footnote 73}

Communication Activities

• Published Report in November 2019 entitled, Joining the Circle – Identifying Key Ingredients for Effective Police Collaboration Within Indigenous Communities.^{Footnote 74}
• Published the Laser Audit of the Application of Gender-based Analysis Plus in 2019, which was created to assess if Public Safety Canada has effective key elements in place that support GBA+ implementation and application.^{Footnote 75}
• Published a Report in 2021 entitled, Crime Prevention Programs in Canada: Examining Key Implementation Elements for Indigenous Populations.^{Footnote 76}
• Has a YouTube Channel, where videos on emergency preparedness, online child sexual exploitation, human trafficking, preparing for floods etc. are posted.^{Footnote 77}

Past Practices

• Through the Community Resilience Fund, Public Safety donated $759,762 to the Young Women’s Christian Association for their Block Hate: Building Resilience against Online Hate initiative in October, 2020.^{Footnote 78}
• Hosted an Expert Symposium in March, 2020 on Addressing Unconscious Bias, Diversity and Inclusion in National Security in Ottawa.^{Footnote 79}
• Gave over $30,000 funding to the Jewish Russian Speaking Community of Toronto to help improve security and ensure that the community can practice their activities safely and securely.^{Footnote 80}
• Chairs the Bias Sensitivity, Diversity, and Identity Working Group.^{Footnote 81}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

• Participates in the Young Women in Public Safety recruitment program.^{Footnote 82}

Department of National Defence (DND)/Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)

Engagement Activities

• Held a roundtable discussion on challenges to security, defence capabilities, and the role of the CAF in 2016 with Indigenous communities.^{Footnote 83}
• On August 26, 2020 senior officials took part in a panel discussion on women and LGBTQ2+ veterans.^{Footnote 84}
• On September 9th, 2020 senior officials took part in a panel discussion on women veterans research and data.^{Footnote 85}
• On May 19th 2021 The Defense Team Pride Advisory Organization hosted a virtual panel discussion on LGBTQ2+ issues.^{Footnote 86}
• Created the Defence Women’s Advisory Organization, which focuses on the consultation to remove barriers to women’s inclusion in the CAF.^{Footnote 87}

Communication Activities

• Published the Visible Minorities Recruitment Campaign Report in 2021.^{Footnote 88}
• On May 17th, 2021 the Minister made a public statement acknowledging International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia, announced support for LGBTQ2+ Defence team members, and acknowledged the wrongs done by the Government of Canada during the “LGBT Purge”.^{Footnote 89}
• The Sexual Misconduct Response Centre publishes an Annual Report.^{Footnote 90}
• Canadian Armed Forces has a YouTube channel, where they post informational videos on topics including the Royal Military College, COVID-19, NATO, career option in the CAF.^{Footnote 91}

Past Practices

• • Created the Defence Advisory Group for persons with Disabilities to offer suggestions and help identify the root causes of any issues faced by the disabled community in CAF.^{Footnote 92}
• Created the Defence Aboriginal Advisory Group, which is made up of military and civilian members with a mission to provide advice to senior leadership on issues impacting the recruitment, retention, development, and promotion of Aboriginal Peoples in the DND, CAF, and CFPSA.^{Footnote 93}
• Created the Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination to review existing organization policies, and practices and provide recommendations to address racism and discrimination within the organization.^{Footnote 94}
• Adjusted dress code policy to include clauses related to religious and cultural accommodations.^{Footnote 95}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

• Began a pilot program in 2017 called Women in Force, which gives women an opportunity to learn about military life by talking to current CAF members and experiencing military lifestyle, fitness training, and hands-on demonstrations of occupations and tactical skills.^{Footnote 96}
• Created six different 6-week Canadian Army Training summer program that is open to Indigenous peoples living in different regions of Canada.^{Footnote 97}
• Created the Aboriginal Leadership Opportunity Year, which gives Indigenous students the opportunity to be enrolled at the Royal Military College for one academic year as an Officer Cadet in the Canadian Armed Forces, where they will enjoy payment according to their rank, as well as free tuition and books.^{Footnote 98}

Communications Security Establishment (CSE)

Engagement Activities

• Employees invited an Indigenous leader with a background in signals intelligence in March 2021, to build cultural understanding and discuss ways CSE can promote reconciliation.^{Footnote 99}
• Employees act as mentors to students involved in Hackergal, a non-profit organization with a mission to introduce middle school girls to coding. They also help sponsor their cross-Canada hackathons.^{Footnote 100}
• Sponsor and mentor in the CyberTitan competition in which teams of Canadian youths grades 7-12 must compete in challenges that are based on scenarios a real cyber defence team might encounter.^{Footnote 101}
• Employees serve as mentors to the teams involved in the Technovation Girls, a global challenge that encourages middle and high school girls to become tech entrepreneurs.^{Footnote 102}
• Hosted the Raspberry Pi workshops, which is a 10-week workshop for high school students to teach the fundamentals of computer science and basic coding skills.^{Footnote 103}

Communication Activities

• Has YouTube Channel educating the public about the organization, phishing, and how to keep oneself “cyber safe”.^{Footnote 104}

Past Practices

• Invited an international speaker and psychologist in January 2021, to lead a department-wide event discussing racism, discrimination, and the importance of cultivating a respectful and inclusive workplace culture.^{Footnote 105}
• Two CSE employees delivered an online presentation titled “Being Black in Canada” to fellow co-workers in February 2021, which shared examples of discrimination from their own lives, and led a discussion on privilege and shared anti-racism resources. They are now adapting the presentation into mandatory training for new employees.^{Footnote 106}
• Hosted a virtual panel discussion in March 2021, where 6 employees spoke about the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 along gender lines.^{Footnote 107}
• Consistently takes part in Ottawa’s Pride Parade. To continue showing support for the LGBTQ2+ Community during COVID, the CSE facilities were decorated in rainbow colours.^{Footnote 108}
• Created a Diversity and Inclusion online discussion channel, which provides a safe space for sharing personal experiences and exchanging resources on how to be an effective ally for marginalized communities.^{Footnote 109}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

• Began working to address systemic barriers for transgender and non-binary persons in 2021 by providing training to employees involved in recruitment. Also began looking at policies to remove any discriminatory practices based on gender identity or gender expression.^{Footnote 110}
• Hosted a virtual recruitment event on July 28, 2021 with Womenhack, which promotes gender equality in tech and helps companies reach qualified women in the tech industry.^{Footnote 111}
• Hosting a virtual recruitment event from August 5-7, 2021 with Pridehacks, which will promote job candidates from the LGBTQ2+ community.^{Footnote 112}
• Created the Workforce Development and Curriculum Guide, which is a guide to the post-secondary education and training requirements for the cyber security workforce roles and specializations.^{Footnote 113}

Global Affairs Canada (GAC)

Engagement Activities

• In 2018-2019, roundtables were organized across Canada aimed at informing the LGBTQ2+ business community about international business development opportunities and trade support programs.^{Footnote 114}
• Attended the Canadian Gay and Lesbian Chamber of Commerce’s 2018 International Business and Leadership Conference.^{Footnote 115}
• Consult the Indigenous Working Group in an ongoing dialogue on a range of trade and investment issues that have been identified as important for Indigenous peoples in Canada.^{Footnote 116}
• Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion, and International Trade co-hosted a roundtable with Sweden’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Nordic Affairs, in which they listened to women entrepreneurs, who shared their experience in innovative sectors and the challenges and opportunities facing women entrepreneurs during the post-COVID 19 economic recovery.^{Footnote 117}

Communication Activities

• May 3, 2021 Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade made a public statement in honour of Asian heritage month, where the many contributions of Asian Canadians were recognized, the rise in racist behavior against people of Asian descent was highlighted, and a continued stance against all forms of racism, xenophobia, and hate was urged.^{Footnote 118}
• July 2021, Minister of Foreign Affairs makes a public statement after visiting Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Center in Israel that he will continue to make efforts to advance Holocaust education, remembrance, and research, to combat antisemitism, and protect human rights at home and abroad.^{Footnote 119}
• Has a YouTube Account informing the public on topics including their Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy, and Foreign Affairs.^{Footnote 120}

Past Practices

• 2018 made a gender pledge that sets out specific commitments and actions that the Trade Policy and Negotiations Branch will undertake going forward with respect to GBA+, trade and gender, and inclusive trade.^{Footnote 121}
• On June 29th, 2020 Episode 40 of GACFiles, the podcast created by Global Affairs Canada, was released. During the episode the Deputy Minister of International Development and a Senior Operations Officer, have a candid and powerful conversation in which the Operations Officer shares his experiences as a Black Canadian and talks about what it means to be allies and to work together to end racism.^{Footnote 122}
• Created Business Women in International Trade, a program that offers products and services to assist women-owned businesses in the area of international trade.^{Footnote 123}
• Created the Indigenous Business Export Support Program, which connects Indigenous-owned businesses to international market opportunities.^{Footnote 124}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

• Created the International Aboriginal Youth Internships Initiative, which offers Indigenous Canadian youth the opportunity to gain professional experience abroad in the field of international development.^{Footnote 125}
• Created the International Youth Internship Program, which offers Canadian youth the ability to gain professional experience abroad in the field of international development.^{Footnote 126}

Engagement Activities in Selected Countries

United States of America

Overarching Government Commitments

• The creation of an Affirmative Action Plan for People with Disabilities by each government agency was made mandatory in 2017 with an update to Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act.^{Footnote 127}
• Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom Potomac Plan of Action, provides instruction of how states should respond to violations and abuses of religious freedom or instances of persecution on account of religion, belief, non-belief.^{Footnote 128}

Engagement Activities

Department of Homeland Security

• When Advanced Imaging Technology came to the forefront as security screening machines, the Transportation Security Administration met with Jewish, Christian and Muslim religious leaders to discuss how this technology related to prescriptions of physical modesty.^{Footnote 129}
• Hold roundtables with Muslim, Arab, Sikh, and Somali communities on issues on the Homeland Security agenda such as: rules governing remittances to foreign relatives, immigration and naturalization policies, protection of civil rights in employment, voting, housing, prosecution of hate crimes, and border searches.^{Footnote 130}
• Hold youth roundtables for young leaders and youth organizations from Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities to share thoughts on the Department’s leadership.^{Footnote 131}
• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services engages with the Somali American leaders in San Diego, Seattle and Lewiston in bi-monthly community conference calls, and includes them in regular roundtables.^{Footnote 132}

Federal Bureau of Investigation

• Created the Specialized Community Outreach team, comprised of special agents, analysts, community outreach specialist, and personnel with language or other specialized skills to assist field offices with establishing new contacts in key communities that are particularly insular or where barriers of fear or suspicion of law enforcement exist.^{Footnote 133}

Communication Activities

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

• Published a report in January 2017 entitled, Examining Workforce Concerns Within the Intelligence Community, which examines the barriers pertaining to hiring, retention, and career development of women, minorities, and persons with disabilities.^{Footnote 134}
• Publishes an annual Demographic Report on the Intelligence Community.^{Footnote 135}

Department of Homeland Security

• Published the Overview of Community Engagement in Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention in July 2020.^{Footnote 136}
• Published the Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2016-2020, which details strategies to attract, recruit, hire, train, and retain a diverse workforce.^{Footnote 137}

Past Practices

Department of Homeland Security

• Released a statement on February 8, 2021 on equal access to COVID-19 vaccines and their support for vaccine distribution sites for undocumented immigrants.^{Footnote 138}
• Customs and Border Protection celebrates “Diversity and Inclusion Months”, where they celebrate different communities and host presentations relating to the communities being honoured that month.^{Footnote 139}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

• Created the Joint Strategy to Advance Equal Employment Opportunity, Diversity, and Inclusion Within the Intelligence Community 2020-2023.^{Footnote 140}
• Co-sponsors the Scholarships for Service program, which offers collegiate scholarships to undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral students who are pursuing a cybersecurity degree and agree to serve in a cybersecurity role with the government for a period upon graduation.^{Footnote 141}

Department of Homeland Security

• Held a U.S. Secret Service Webinar with Hispanic-Serving Institutions in April 2017, which featured representatives from the U.S. Secret Service who provided an overview of their mission, hiring process, and potential career tracks.^{Footnote 142}
• Held a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Women in Law Enforcement Webinar in February 2018, which featured a panel of female ICE special agents and deportation officers who explained the application process and shared their experiences in law enforcement and their career paths at ICE.^{Footnote 143}
• Hosted student tours 2018-2019 of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center to allows students to tour the Watch Floor and hear from cybersecurity professionals about careers in cybersecurity.^{Footnote 144}
• Created the Privacy and Diversity Office, which utilizes the Diversity and Inclusion Program Committees (DIPC), comprised of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) employee volunteers to build upon diversity and inclusion within the CBP workforce. The Office provides local CBP management with leadership, support, and direction in the execution of CBPs Diversity and Inclusion Management Plan.^{Footnote 145}

Federal Bureau of Investigation

• Have field offices sponsor teen academies, a program designed to introduce youth to the FBI.^{Footnote 146}
• Have an ‘Adopt-a-School/Junior Agent’ special program, which is designed to introduce youth to the FBI.^{Footnote 147}

United Kingdom

Overarching Government Commitments

Northern Ireland

• Improved Transparency and Public Accountability Commitment, which is a commitment in their National Action Plan to identify, develop and implement sustainable open government actions to drive the open government agenda across the Northern Ireland departments in the area of transparency and accountability.^{Footnote 148}
• Citizen Participation and Open Policy Making Commitment, which is a commitment in their National Action Plan to develop effective open policy-making and public engagement methods.^{Footnote 149}

Scotland

• Commitment to Providing a Framework to Support Systemic Change and to Improve the way People are able to Participate in Open Policy-Making and Service Delivery, which is a commitment in their National Action Plan to develop a ‘Participation Framework’ that guides good practices across government.^{Footnote 150}
• Commitment to Improve the Accountability of Public Services, which is a commitment in their National Action Plan to work collaboratively within the current regulatory framework to improve citizens’ understanding of and access to accountability mechanisms and to develop a policy-making approach that considers the impacts of public policy and decision-making on people in a systematic and coherent way, and to recognize the importance of citizens in driving high-quality public services.^{Footnote 151}

Engagement Activities

Office For Security and Counter-Terrorism

• As part of their CONTEST strategy, the organization engages with and supports civil society organizations to deliver programs at schools and families to build their awareness of the risks of radicalization, their resilience to terrorist narratives and propaganda, and to help them know what to do if they have concerns that someone may have been radicalized.^{Footnote 152}
• As part of their CONTEST strategy, the organization provides ‘Prevent Training’ to local authorities, health workers, social care staff, and educators so that they understand the risk of radicalization and know what to do if someone has concerns.^{Footnote 153}
• As part of their CONTEST Strategy, the organization runs the Desistance and Disengagement program, which provides tailored interventions and practical support designed to tackle the drivers of radicalization around universal needs for identity, self-esteem, meaning, and purpose, and to address personal grievances that the extremist narrative has exacerbated through mentoring, psychological support, and theological and ideological advice. This program focuses on people who are subject to court approved conditions, including all terrorism and terrorism-related offenders on probation license, and those who have returned from conflict zones in Syria or Iraq and are subject to Temporary Exclusion Orders.^{Footnote 154}

Government Communications Headquarters

• Staff participate in the STEM Ambassador Programme, which encourages young people to enjoy STEM subjects and supports teachers by explaining how STEM skills are used in industry and research.^{Footnote 155}
• Work with schools to help give students interview practice and paired reading schemes.^{Footnote 156}

Communication Activities

The Security Service (MI5)

• Was the subject of a fly-on-the-wall documentary with ITV in 2020.^{Footnote 157}
• The Director General was interviewed by Times Radio along with the head of Counter-Terrorism Policing in the UK in May 2021.^{Footnote 158}

National Crime Agency

• Publishes an Annual Report on the agency’s Gender Pay Gap.^{Footnote 159}

Government Communications Headquarters

• Published the first history on the Government Communications Headquarters entitled, Behind the Enigma, which reveals to the public how the intelligence, cyber and security agency has helped to keep the country safe for 100 years.^{Footnote 160}
• Publishes an Annual Report on the organizations Gender Pay Gap.^{Footnote 161}

Past Practices

The Security Service (MI5)

• Celebrated International Women’s Day during the first two weeks of March 2021 with a series of digital events, talks, and blogs posts during which, employees explored how gender has impacted their careers, listened to the experiences of colleagues, and challenged their behaviours and biases.^{Footnote 162}
• Celebrated Pride Month in June 2021 by hosting a number of virtual events and flying the Progress Pride Flag above their London Headquarters.^{Footnote 163}

National Ballistics Intelligence Service

• Created the NABIS people plan, which is a plan on how the Service will continue to recruit, retain, and develop their workforce.^{Footnote 164}

Government Communications Headquarters

• Placed a giant LGBTQ2+ inspired artwork of Alan Turing in the middle of their Headquarters in Cheltenham, to celebrate his legacy and him becoming the first gay man to appear on the UK banknote.^{Footnote 165}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

The Security Service (MI5)

• Offers the Summer Diversity Intelligence Internship, where a student from a minority ethnic background will have the opportunity to help MI5 investigate and disrupt international terrorism. Upon completion, they will be invited to apply for a permanent position as an Intelligence Officer in their Intelligence Officer Development Programme.^{Footnote 166}

National Crime Agency

• Created the Gender Equality Group, which provides advice and support to officers of all gender identities and gender expressions on gender-related issues in the workplace and advises on gender concerns relating to policies, procedures, and best practices.^{Footnote 167}

Government Communications Headquarters

• A senior director joined two dyslexic intelligence analysts on the video podcast called D.Spot, during which they explore the dyslexic strengths that make them the ideal analysts for the modern era, how it is used as a “secret weapon” when it comes to protecting the UK and its citizens from harm, and how the organization is committed to recruiting people with dyslexia and other neurodiverse individuals into the organization.^{Footnote 168}

Australia

Overarching Government Commitments

• Public Interest Disclosure Act promotes integrity and accountability in the Australian Public Sector by Encouraging the disclosure of information about suspected wrongdoing, protecting people who make disclosures, and requiring agencies to take action.^{Footnote 169}

Engagement Activities

Australian Border Force

• Conducted outreach and educational activities in the Wimmera Mallee region to help understand their obligations when hiring overseas workers.^{Footnote 170}

Australian Federal Police

• Implemented a Reconciliation Action Plan (RAP) advisory board with Indigenous representation in 2018 that convened every quarter.^{Footnote 171}
• Participates in external National Reconciliation Week Events and also hosts its own internal events.^{Footnote 172}
• Officers in Alice Springs are supporting the Making a Difference Program, in which they partner with a local training and fitness gym and take 12 students aged 12-14 for an 8-week program that includes fitness sessions, discussions on respect, resilience, positive relationships, and making good choices.^{Footnote 173}
• Created the Community Liaison Team to practice community engagement and build positive and trusting relationships with all Australian communities.^{Footnote 174}

Australian Defence Force

• Initiated the Army Aboriginal Community Assistance Programme, in which the 19th Chief Engineer Works helps design, plan, coordinate and control engineering works in selected Aboriginal communities, as well as coordinate the health and veterinary training and employability skills training.^{Footnote 175}

Communication Activities

Australian Federal Police

• Have a ‘Fact Check’ Page on their website where they counter dis and/or misinformation such as misquoted officials and public statements that they perceive to be incorrect.^{Footnote 176}

Australian Secret Intelligence Service

• Director takes part in a one-hour interview on a podcast in 2019 entitled, Australia in the World, in which he talks about what the organization does, why Australia needs it, and describes some past achievements.^{Footnote 177}
• Director-General took part in a 4-episode interview series about the purpose and principles of the organization and what spying is like in the 21st century.^{Footnote 178}

Past Practices

Australian Federal Police

• Everyone that participates in the AFP Directions Traineeship Program are provided with cultural awareness training.^{Footnote 179}
• Acknowledgement of country protocols have been embedded into organizational practices as well as the AFP email signature block.^{Footnote 180}
• Provides Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Cultural Awareness Training to AFP recruits, which includes face-to-face delivery by Malunggang Indigenous Officers Network members.^{Footnote 181}
• Published a report entitled, Cultural Change: Gender Diversity and Inclusion in the Australian Federal Police, which followed an independent review of the organization by a former Sex Discrimination Commissioner.^{Footnote 182}

Australian Security Intelligence Organization

• Created and Published a Reconciliation Action Plan, which provides a framework for the organization that identifies the steps it will work through to build and enhance the respect they have for the cultures of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The plan is structured according to four pillars: relationships, respect, opportunities, and reporting.^{Footnote 183}

Australian Department of Defence

• Created and Published the Defence Reconciliation Action Plan to increase their understanding and appreciation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultural issues and to embed cultural awareness into their daily business operations to create a more inclusive and agile workforce.^{Footnote 184}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

Australian Border Force

• Created an Affirmative Measures Indigenous Recruitment Pathway that is open to any candidate that identifies as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander.^{Footnote 185}

Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

• Created the Reconciliation Action Plan, which outlines specific actions the agency will take to try and address the disadvantages that face Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and to foster respectful and productive relationships with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in all aspects of the agency’s business.^{Footnote 186}

Australian Federal Police

• Created the Directions Program, which is an integrated employment and development program specifically for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.^{Footnote 187}
• Began the Women in Technology and Innovation Initiative, which brings people together to support, mentor, and retain women within technology and innovation, while providing a vehicle to raise awareness of relevant issues, influence workplace culture, facilitate change, and champion women.^{Footnote 188}

Australian Defence Force

• Created the Army/Navy Indigenous Development Program for Indigenous Australians who do not currently meet the requirements or standards for General Entry in the army or navy. They are given the opportunity to undertake work-related training and improve their fitness and understanding of army life before their embark on recruit training. They also have access to an Indigenous Career Coach.^{Footnote 189}

Australian Department of Defence

• Participates in the Indigenous Australian Government Development Program, which is a one year entry-level employment and development program open to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.^{Footnote 190}

New Zealand

Overarching Government Commitments

• The Official Information Act creates a public right of access to information held by government bodies.^{Footnote 191}

Engagement Activities

New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service

• Took part in the 33 public hui (assembly) with Muslim communities as well as wider faith and ethnic communities following the Christchurch attacks on March 15, 2019.^{Footnote 192}

New Zealand Police

• Took part in the 33 public hui with Muslim communities as well as wider faith and ethnic communities following the Christchurch attacks on March 15, 2019.^{Footnote 193}
• Created a group of iwi liaison officers who help navigate cultural issues and work on improving police relationships with Māori communities in each police district.^{Footnote 194}
• Created the Te Pae Oranga Iwi Community Panels, which is a way that Police and iwi/ Māori partners deal with crime and prevent reoffending. This panel, and the advice of the community leaders on it, is available to people from all ethnicities and walks of life who have underlying issues and need help getting their life back on track. This panel listens to the people who come seeking help and helps them create plans to overcome problems like addiction, abuse, financial stress, and difficulties obtaining employment or education.^{Footnote 195}
• As part of their Integrated Safety Response Pilot Program the New Zealand Police has included a whānau-centred approach, which is an approach specifically geared towards assisting Māori in healing from family violence. This approach is culturally-grounded, holistic, and focused on improving the wellbeing of the whānau (family).^{Footnote 196}
• Created The Police Commissioner’s Joint Māori Pacific and Ethnic Focus Forum, which brings together the leaders of diverse communities to provide advice and guidance on mutual priorities for both the Police and these communities.^{Footnote 197}
• The organization has created a website which holds a reference book entitled, Practical Reference for Religious Diversity’ which provides an overview of 7 major faiths, it also holds a multilingual phrasebook to assist with communication, multilingual crime prevention resources, as well as a bilingual notice to persons in custody forms and adult and youth rights cautions.^{Footnote 198}
• The NZ Police provide orientation programs for refugees, in which they provide education on road rules and general safety tips upon resettlement.^{Footnote 199}

Communication Activities

The Government Communications Security Bureau & New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service

• Published a Gender Pay Gap Action Plan in 2020.^{Footnote 200}
• Published a Diversity and Inclusion Strategy.^{Footnote 201}

New Zealand Police

• Created Orientation Videos for Refugees who are destined for NZ, but still offshore. This orientation video is on safety and introduces them to the NZ Police.^{Footnote 202}

Past Practices

The Government Communications Security Bureau & New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service

• Developed Transitioning Guidelines, which provides helpful information and practical advice for staff who are in the midst of gender transition, or are considering beginning the process.^{Footnote 203}
• Have developed their own rainbow-inclusion training and education, which is available to all staff.^{Footnote 204}

New Zealand Police

• In 2009 and 2015 the New Zealand Police signed Memorandums of Understanding with the Federation of Islamic Association of New Zealand and Multicultural New Zealand, which sets out the principles and processes through which the Parties will work together to ensure effective independent oversight of Police conduct.^{Footnote 205}
• Frontline police staff are trained in Māori culture and protocol in the Royal New Zealand Police College, and more advanced training is provided to senior staff when they return to the Royal New Zealand Police College for specialist courses.^{Footnote 206}
• The Commissioner of Police has a group of senior kaumatua and kuia who meet with him regularly to discuss issues of mutual interest and concern called the Commissioner’s Māori Focus Forum. This group helps guide policing strategy in regard to Māori and provides advice on issues of the moment.^{Footnote 207}
• Community Justice Panels are available to all communities and are operating in police districts around NZ. A low-level offender is given the choice of attending a panel hearing overseen by members of their community, or having the matter decided by the Police and the Court.^{Footnote 208}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

The Government Communications Security Bureau & The Secret Intelligence Service

• Underwent a complete Diversity and Inclusion assessment process, which tested whether the organization understands and welcomes sexual and gender diversity and whether they had an on-going improvement process. The Bureau passed the assessment and was awarded a rainbow tick, by Rainbow Tick New Zealand, which shows employees, customers, and the wider world that the organization is inclusive and reflects the community it is based in.^{Footnote 209}
• Takes part in the Poutamatia Development Programme, which is a program developed in 2019 built to support women within the intelligence community with their personal and professional career development and self-confidence.^{Footnote 210}

New Zealand Defence Force

• Has adopted a bi-cultural policy, which recognizes Māori cultural interests and the special place of the Māori within the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). This policy helps the NZDF meet obligations to recognize the aims and aspirations of Māori people, to respect and honour Māori language, customs, and items of cultural significance within NZDF, and enhance military ethos, fighting spirit, and camaraderie.^{Footnote 211}
• Created OverWatch, a group that provides support and guidance to NZDF’s LGBTIQ+ community as well as to their commanders and managers, families, friends, and colleagues.^{Footnote 212}
• The army, navy, and air force all have teams of Māori cultural advisors to help support and provide advice to command and personnel.^{Footnote 213}

Germany

Overarching Government Commitments

• The Diversity Charter/Charta der Viefalt was launched in 2006 and covers the following 9 fields of discrimination: gender, race, nationality and ethnic origin, religion, physical ability, age, and sexual orientation and identity.^{Footnote 214}

Engagement Activities

Office for the Protection of the Constitution / Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz

• The Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Lower Saxony offers a travelling exhibition for schools on right-wing extremism.^{Footnote 215}

Communication Activities

No information found.

Past Practices

Office for the Protection of the Constitution / Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz

• Staff of the Lower Saxony Office for the Protection of the Constitution receive specific training to increase their intercultural awareness.^{Footnote 216}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

Office for the Protection of the Constitution / Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz

• The job ads released by the Lower Saxony Office for the Protection of the Constitution encourage persons of all nationalities to apply.^{Footnote 217}

The Netherlands

Overarching Government Commitments

• Equal Treatment Act: An Act to protect against discrimination based on religion, belief, political affiliation, race, sex, nationality, heterosexual orientation or marital status.^{Footnote 218}

Engagement Activities

National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security / Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid

• Conducts periodic consultations with imams addressing themes such as countering radicalization and opposing discrimination, as well as the establishment of a rehabilitation or exit facility.^{Footnote 219}

Communication Activities

No information found.

Past Practices

National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security / Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid

• Creating a support facility for those close to radicalized/radicalizing individuals.^{Footnote 220}

National Police Corps / Korps Nationale Politie

• The Police Force in Amsterdam trained 300 officials in management and leadership as part of its “Safe Climate” program. This training was built to help participants become aware of prejudices and stereotypes, to listen and withhold immediate judgements, gain cultural awareness, improve communications skills, improve community skills, and learn different styles of leadership and behaviours relevant to managing diverse environments.^{Footnote 221}
• Worked with the National Diversity Expertise Centre, a short-term initiative that worked through 2014. They advise on working in multi-ethnic environments, promoting diversity within agencies, addressing discrimination, and handling public security problems in multi-ethnic areas.^{Footnote 222}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

No information found.

Norway

Overarching Government Commitments

• The Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act.^{Footnote 223}
• Action Plan to Combat Discrimination and Hatred Towards Muslims, which is meant to prevent and deter racism and discrimination against Muslims and persons believed to be Muslims.^{Footnote 224}

Engagement Activities

Norwegian Police Security Service / Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste

• Adopted the Samordning av locale kriminalitetsforebyggende (SLT) policing model, in which the Service works with local authorities and communities to come together and share information, keep communities safe, and try to prevent radicalization.^{Footnote 225}

Communication Activities

Norwegian Police Security Service / Politiets sikkerhetsjeneste

• Have a YouTube channel where they release educational videos informing the public about far-right radicalization, threat assessments, threats to government officials, and politically motivated violent extremism.^{Footnote 226}
• Have a Podcast that educates the public on topics such as: threats to government officials, terrorism and youths, and counter-intelligence.^{Footnote 227}

Past Practices

Norwegian Police Security Service

• Youths between the ages of 15-18, who have committed extremist acts may be subject to a follow-up program as an alternative to jail if it is considered that such close monitoring may prevent future crimes.^{Footnote 228}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

Norwegian Armed Forces

• In 2013, they extended mandatory conscription to women as well as men. *When addressing diversifying the armed forces, the only example given is its move to conscript women. There is no mention of racial minorities, differently-abled, or LGBTQ2+ when mentioning increasing diversity. The pictures in their government documents are solely of Caucasians.^{Footnote 229}

Sweden

Overarching Government Commitments

• Discrimination Act was made to combat discrimination on grounds of sex, gender identity or expression, ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, sexual orientation, and age.^{Footnote 230}
• National Plan to Combat Racism, Similar Forms of Hostility, and Hate Crime, which details the first steps in what they identify as a continuous and broad effort to fight for inclusion and to fight against racism.^{Footnote 231}

Engagement Activities

Swedish Police Authority / Polismyndigheten

• From 2005-2009, a diversity project called, “Give and Take Every Day” was organized in the district of Soedertoern, to improve police encounters with youth. It facilitated joint training sessions with police and minority groups to explore each group’s experience of being stopped or of conducting a stop.^{Footnote 232}
• A youth council in Stockholm was created following violent clashes between youth and the police in Stockholm. The council is mostly made up of ethnic minorities. At these meetings police discuss their role with youth representatives, and young people can raise issues of police conduct. There is a county-wide youth council, as well as 9 local councils, each run by the local borough commander.^{Footnote 233}
• Police in Stockholm began recruiting volunteers in 2004, who are given training and become involved in neighbourhood policing; meant to build trust between the police and neighbourhood residents.^{Footnote 234}

Swedish Security Service / Sӓkerhetspolisen

• To prevent unlawful intelligence activities, perpetrated by actors on behalf of another country, that target refugees in Sweden, the Service conducts outreach aimed at groups at risk so as to increase awareness of the fact that such activities occur and are a criminal offence.^{Footnote 235}

Communication Activities

Swedish Defence Research Agency / Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut

• On their website, they share information about the agency and their responsibilities in ‘easy’ Swedish, as well as five minority languages: Suomi/Finnish, Yiddish, Romani Kalderash, Meӓnkieli, and Åarjelsaemien/South Sámi.^{Footnote 236}

Past Practices

Swedish Armed Forces / Försvarsmakten

• Carry out gender equality analysis before all decisions are made in all areas and at all levels of the organization. *Note, when mentioning equality they only specifically note binary gender, and do not touch on transgender, two-spirit, racial equality, or other marginalized populations.^{Footnote 237}
• Has a gender coaching program, in which senior military staff are coached by experienced gender experts over a 12-month period. The gender coach supports them by helping them develop and implement individual actions plans to promote gender equality and by assisting them in gaining a high level of understanding in applying a gender perspective in their line of work.^{Footnote 238}

Swedish Police Authority / Polismyndigheten

• Officers receive specific police tactics training that addresses ethnic profiling.^{Footnote 239}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment / Försvarets radioanstalt

• Their website indicates that this agency has a gender equality and diversity plan, which was created to help the agency promote equal rights and opportunities regardless of gender, transgender identity or expression, ethnicity, religion or other beliefs, disability, sexual orientation, or age.^{Footnote 240} *Note a public copy of the plan could not be found during the research process

Swedish Police Authority / Polismyndigheten

• In 2009, the Spira Project, a project aimed at increasing ethnic minority representation in the police force, was rolled out in all Stockholm boroughs. This project picks applicants from non-Nordic backgrounds, provides them with introductory training followed by 13 months of practical activities with the police authorities. Each participant is also supplied with a coach during the entire project process. Following the success in Stockholm, similar projects have been launched in Malmo and Gothenburg.^{Footnote 241}

France

Overarching Government Commitments

• Beneficiaries of the Employment Obligation (Bénéficiaires de l’obligation d’emploi), which is an obligation for all enterprises, with 20 or more employees, public or private, are obliged to employ disabled workers as 6% of the total number of employees.^{Footnote 242}
• Agreement Protocol on Professional Equality Between Women and Men in the Public Service (Protocole d’accord relative à l’égalité professionnelle entre les femmes et les hommes dans la fonction publique), which is a memorandum of understanding on equality between women and men in the civil service with all trade union organizations and representatives of public employers.^{Footnote 243}

Engagement Activities

National Police / Police nationale

• Since June 2013, many police stations have been distributing satisfaction surveys aimed at all users who come to the police station reception. In addition, some police stations have also conducted a survey to collect the public's expectations regarding safety. This can be a survey aimed at schoolchildren, shopkeepers or even the inhabitants of a neighbourhood.^{Footnote 244}
• Starting in 2008 retired police officers had the opportunity to be enrolled in a civilian reserve and serve as delegates for police-population cohesion (Délégués à la cohésion police-population (DCPP)), they are responsible for strengthening the link between the population, local actors and the police. In 2012, this program was strengthened with posts in each priority security zone (Zone de sécurité prioritaire (ZSP)) under the jurisdiction of the national police. DCPPs act both as relays between the population and police services and real actors of crime prevention.^{Footnote 245}

Communication Activities

National Cybersecurity Agency of France / Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information

• Released a guide for public and/or private organizations called Controlling the Digital Risk, which supports them through a process that drains strategic, economic, and reputation issues.^{Footnote 246}

Past Practices

National Police / Police nationale

• On September 2, 2013, the national police set up the Inspectorate General of the National Police (Inspection générale de la police nationale (IGPN)) reporting platform, intended to receive reports of possible breaches of conduct by police officers.^{Footnote 247}
• Since January 1, 2014, police officers have been wearing an identification number, facilitating their identification.^{Footnote 248}

National Gendarmerie / Gendarmerie nationale

• At the end of 2013, the national gendarmerie, following the example of the national police, set up the Inspection générale de la gendarmerie nationale (IGGN) reporting platform, intended to receive reports of possible breaches of conduct by gendarmerie officers.^{Footnote 249}
• Since January 1, 2014, the gendarmes have been wearing an identification number, facilitating their identification.^{Footnote 250}

Initiatives to Hire and Retain a Diverse Work Force

Ministry of Armed Forces / Ministère des Armées)

• December 14th 2020, signed with the ministry’s trade unions the ‘Plan for Professional Equality between Men and Women Civilians of the Ministry of Armed Forces’, which provides concrete answers to advance professional equality.^{Footnote 251}
• Made a Disability and Inclusion Action Plan, which defines the objectives of disability policy and sets priority areas for efforts to integrate and maintain the employment of people with disabilities.^{Footnote 252}

The National Directorate of Customs Intelligence and Investigations / Direction national du renseignement et des enquêtes douanières

• Created the Customs Professional Equality Plan 2020-2022, which is a plan dedicated to professional equality between men and women by reducing inequalities in career paths, promoting gender diversity, combatting gender-based and sexual violence, and acting positively on the quality of life at work.^{Footnote 253}

Recommendations and Best Practices on Engagement from Non-Governmental Organizations

Outreach and Engagement

The Brennan Center

• Community outreach programs should not be used by law enforcement or security organizations as opportunities to conduct surveillance or gather intelligence because “mixed-motive programs have had the effect of undermining critical trust between law enforcement and these communities.”^{Footnote 254}
• Outreach efforts focused on Muslim communities should recognize and attend to community concerns, rather than build relationships to enhance counter-terrorism initiatives.^{Footnote 255}
• All outreach activities should be completely transparent regarding its purpose and the government agencies involved.^{Footnote 256}
• Law enforcement agencies should not spearhead engagement initiatives, but should be invited, when necessary, to answer questions, or if invited by community institutions.^{Footnote 257}
• All community partnership programs should include transparent policies that provide robust safeguards, ensuring that community outreach does not turn into intelligence gathering.^{Footnote 258}
• For programs that are focused on mental-health or other sensitive interventions, agencies should develop specific protocols to protect confidentiality; these protocols should be made publicly available.^{Footnote 259}

National Council of Canadian Muslims

• Security agencies and officials should conduct outreach efforts with communities that are designed to empower them and allows such communities to act as real partners.^{Footnote 260}

Deloitte

• Governments can use digital tools and platforms to enhance civic participation, which allows citizens to look over government policies, and helps enhance the efficacy of solutions. It also allows the government to signal to citizens that it is willing to listen to their needs.^{Footnote 261}

World Bank

• Asserts that there is a causal relationship between citizen engagement and trust in institutions. The more citizens participate, the more they feel they have somehow shaped their government, and this leads to increased levels of trust.^{Footnote 262}

Information/Intelligence Gathering

The Brennan Center

• When trying to prevent terrorism, security agencies should only pursue those who are believed to be organizing or performing acts of violence based on concrete facts and proof of criminal activity rather than “vague notions of alienation and political beliefs.”^{Footnote 263}

National Council of Canadian Muslims

• Security agencies should cease using inappropriate information gathering practices. Examples of such practices include: interrogating employers and showing up at workplaces; offering favours or money in exchange for information; intimidating and/or threatening people; asking questions surrounding peoples’ religious practices and commitment to Islam; persuading people against seeking legal representation; and, using false identification- thereby impeding peoples’ ability to file complaints.^{Footnote 264}

International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group

• Security agencies should no longer attempt to recruit members of vulnerable Muslim populations, such as students and refugees claimants, as informants.^{Footnote 265}

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

The Brennan Center

• All safeguards used in countering violent extremism (CVE) programs should cover all agencies and programs. Furthermore, all information regarding such programs should be published to an online central portal.^{Footnote 266}
• All CVE programs that are supported or funded by government agencies should be evaluated by privacy and civil liberties officers and/or lawyers at the agency. The criteria and methodology used in their evaluation should be made publicly available.^{Footnote 267}
• There should be a process put in place whereby those who feel that their rights have been violated due to a CVE program can seek redress.^{Footnote 268}
• All training materials, information sharing processes, and evaluation tools associated with CVE should be made publicly available.^{Footnote 269}
• Data collected from CVE programs that include social or educational components such as conflict resolution, youth engagement, and family support groups, should not be given to law enforcement or security agencies.^{Footnote 270}
• Security agencies should begin funding more studies on the effectiveness of their CVE programs.^{Footnote 271}
• All evaluations of CVE programs must include indicators to measure the potential negative consequences of these programs such as erosion of trust, undermining of constitutional norms, stigmatization of Muslim communities etc.^{Footnote 272}

National Council of Canadian Muslims

• Security agencies and officials should make a concerted effort not to conflate religiosity with radicalization or with an inclination to commit violent acts.^{Footnote 273}

Countering Radicalization

The Brennan Center

• Any research conducted into the drivers and signs of radicalization that the government relies on when creating policies should: 1. Use unbiased sampling, control groups, and other reliable social scientific methods; 2. Subject their findings to peer review; and, 3. Publish the results.^{Footnote 274}

Conference of Defence Associations Institute

• Organizations involved in counter-radicalization intervention programs should distinguish between the pre-criminal and the criminal space when it comes to radicalization to violence and should be “transparent about the relationship between the preventative and investigatory realms.”^{Footnote 275}

National Council of Canadian Muslims

• Security agencies should produce and disseminate literature to help communities identify and address radicalization that they believe may lead to violence.^{Footnote 276}

Noor Cultural Centre

• Training materials focusing on radicalization must not have an Islam-centric focus.^{Footnote 277}

Communications and Transparency

The Brennan Center

• Government funding of domestic counter-radicalization-messaging initiatives should be made public knowledge so that these programs do not cross the line into secret government propaganda.^{Footnote 278}

National Council of Canadian Muslims

• Security agencies should cease using terminology that links Islam with terrorism. Instead, they should focus on using consistent language that contextualizes and correctly classifies those who commit acts of violent extremism.^{Footnote 279}

Noor Cultural Center

• State initiatives to address violence against Muslim women must include addressing societal racism. Fixating on Muslim culture as the primary concern for this violence fails to address the more common reason for attack: racism.^{Footnote 280}

Deloitte

• Transparency in actions can help foster trust in government.^{Footnote 281}
• Truthful and regular communications, using multiple channels, can help drive broader transparency.^{Footnote 282}
• Co-creating solutions with stakeholders allows government agencies to improve capabilities by tapping into a variety of resources, skills, and talent from elsewhere to help achieve a common goal.^{Footnote 283}
• Build systemic transparency. The article cites Taiwan’s “citizen-powered approach and open-source digital democracy approach [which] has helped build broader institutional transparency in the country.”^{Footnote 284}

Data Collection

National Council of Canadian Muslims

• Security agencies should collect disaggregated data based on the ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds of the individuals they interview and/or investigate, and publicly report on it.^{Footnote 285}
• When redacted security reports are released to the public, agencies should include clarification surrounding the “limited scope of use of such redacted reports without the availability of underlying context and data.”^{Footnote 286}

Noor Cultural Centre

• Security agencies must collect and analyze race-disaggregated data on national security operations, so that the impacts of security practices and policies on particular communities can be assessed.^{Footnote 287}

Date modified:

2022-05-31