Horizontal Evaluation of the Project to Enhance the Passenger Protect Program

Horizontal Evaluation of the Project to Enhance the Passenger Protect Program PDF Version (1,053Kb)

Table of contents

• Executive Summary
• 1. Background
• 2. Engagement Purpose and Methodology
• 3. Findings
  • 3.1 Relevance
    • 3.1.1 Continued Need
    • 3.1.2 Roles and Responsibilities
  • 3.2 Passenger Protect Program Operations Centre
  • 3.3 Centralized Screening
    • 3.3.1 Implementation
    • 3.3.2 Challenges
    • 3.3.3 Benefits
  • 3.4 Canadian Travel Number
    • 3.4.1 Implementation
    • 3.4.2 Challenges
    • 3.4.3 Benefits
  • 3.5 Stakeholder Engagement and GBA Plus
    • 3.5.1 Stakeholder Engagement
    • 3.5.2 Addressing Stigma in the PPP
  • 3.6 Project Delivery
    • 3.6.1 Governance
    • 3.6.2 Best Practices and Lesson Learned
  • 3.7 Transition Plan
• 4. Conclusions
• 5. Recommendations
• 6. Management Action Plan
• Annex A: Project Governance Committees

Executive Summary

The Passenger Protect Program (PPP) is an aviation security program that was originally launched in 2007. While initially established based on authorities in the Aeronautics Act, the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA) came into force in 2015 and now provides the legislative framework for the PPP. Through the PPP, individuals who may pose a threat to aviation security, or who may travel by air to commit a terrorist act, can be prevented from boarding a plane or may be required to undergo additional security screening.

In 2019, the Government of Canada committed to enhancing the PPP with a centralized screening solution, as well as a redress system known as the Canadian Travel Number (CTN). Since then, Public Safety Canada (PS), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Transport Canada (TC) and Shared Services Canada (SSC) have been working collaboratively to develop and launch enhancements to the PPP. 

What we examined

The purpose of this evaluation was to examine the implementation of the project to enhance the PPP, including the centralized screening solution, the CTN and the Passenger Protect Program Operations Centre (PPOC). The evaluation also examined the impact of COVID-19 on the project, the effect of the project components on Gender-based Analysis Plus factors, and the plans in place to transition the enhancements made to the PPP from the project phase to the operational phase. The evaluation covered the years from the launch of the project in 2019 to March 2022. Relevant documents produced between April and October 2022 were also included to ensure up to date performance data and relevant significant developments were included.

What we found

1. There is a continued need for the PPP as threats to national security continue to exist and evolve.
2. Project activities align with departmental roles and responsibilities and will continue to align following transition to steady state operations.
3. The PPPOC at TC has been successfully established and is meeting the needs of the program.
4. The centralized screening solution has been implemented and is operational.
5. Outages of the centralized screening solution continue to be a challenge; however, a system to resolve these issues is in development.
6. The centralized screening solution has improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the PPP. Benefits have been realized for air carriers, partner departments and travellers.
7. The CTN is providing a redress system for individuals identified as false name matches. While application processing delays were initially experienced, processing times have significantly improved.
8. Communication about the purpose and intended use of the CTN was initially unclear, however the program implemented changes to communication materials which appeared to be effective.
9. The introduction of the CTN has been directly responsible for improving the air travel experience for individuals who were falsely matched to the SATA List.
10. Partner departments are actively engaging with project stakeholders, including the public, civil advocacy groups, the air industry and the travel booking industry.
11. The implementation of the enhancements to the PPP has decreased the opportunity for biases to impact travellers.
12. The governance structure established for the project was effective. While informal relationships and collaboration among departments were strong, there may be a need to explore program governance following the sunsetting of project governance committees.
13. The project was delivered in an efficient and effective way in large part due to a robust governance structure, clearly defined roles and responsibilities and strong communication between partner departments.
14. A transition plan for the PPP’s operations following the completion of the project is in place. Despite this, some concerns remain about specific aspects of the program going forward.

Recommendations

The Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security, PS should:

1. Work with partner departments to conduct a review of roles and responsibilities, program governance and resources within a year of the completion of the project, in order to ensure sustainability of the program following the addition of the enhancements.

1. Background

The Passenger Protect Program (PPP) is an aviation security program that was originally launched in 2007. While initially established based on authorities in the Aeronautics Act, the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA) came into force in 2015 and now provides the legislative framework for the PPP.

Through the PPP, individuals who may pose a threat to aviation security, or who may travel by air to commit a terrorist act, can be prevented from boarding a plane or may be required to undergo additional security screening. Having been identified as a potential threat through a nomination process led by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and/or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and then determined, by the Minister of Public Safety (or a delegate), to meet the legal threshold, these individuals are added to the SATA List, sometimes called the “no-fly list”. This list is used to screen passengers travelling to, from, and within Canada. 

Prior to the project to enhance the PPP, challenges with the program were identified. More specifically, when air carriers were responsible for screening, there were privacy concerns and the potential for inconsistent screening.  Furthermore, there were no redress options for travellers who were experiencing travel delays and sentiments of stigmatization due to false name matches with others on the SATA List.

With these challenges in mind, Budget 2018 committed to enhancing the PPP with a centralized screening solution, as well as a redress system known as the Canadian Travel Number (CTN). Since then, Public Safety Canada (PS), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Transport Canada (TC) and Shared Services Canada (SSC) have been working collaboratively to develop and launch enhancements to the PPP. 

The SATA List is an official government record which includes the name, any aliases, date of birth, gender and other information that serves to identify an individual. For security and privacy reasons, the SATA prevents the disclosure of whether someone is, or is not, on the SATA List.

In June 2019, the National Security Act, 2017  was amended to provide the legislative framework for the Government of Canada to screen passengers against the SATA List and put in place the CTN. In order to make these amendments to the PPP, a project to enhance the PPP was established. There were three main components of the project.

The Passenger Protect Program Operations Centre (PPPOC) provides a centralized hub at TC, which is available 24/7/365. The PPPOC is responsible for working directly with air carriers and partner departments to manage the vetting of passenger information against potential matches to the SATA List and ensuring air carriers’ compliance with the Secure Air Travel Regulations (SATR).

The centralized screening solution allows air carriers who have been tested, certified and onboarded to share passenger data with the CBSA beginning 72 hours prior to a flight, in order to have passengers’ name, date of birth, gender and, if provided, CTN, screened against the SATA List to determine if there are matches.

The CTN is a unique number for which travellers can voluntarily apply, and when used during flight booking, may reduce the potential for delays if caused by a false name match to the SATA List. When a traveller provides a CTN while booking a flight, it will be used by the centralized screening solution as one of several unique identifiers to determine if the passenger is a match to the SATA List.

On November 4, 2020, the final provisions of amendments to the SATA and the SATR came into force, initially requiring all air carriers to be in compliance with the regulations by November 4, 2022. As the project progressed, further amendments to the SATR were made, extending the deadline for compliance to March 4, 2023.

Authorities for the project, given by the Treasury Board Secretariat, are set to expire on March 31, 2023. At this time, the project will be considered complete, and all components will have transitioned to steady state program operations.

Four departments and agencies have been working collaboratively to implement the project to enhance the PPP.

PS leads the administration of the PPP and works with security agencies and other federal government partners to add and remove individuals from the SATA List. They are also responsible for the coordination of the project and the CTN.

The CBSA is responsible for the technology and infrastructure for the centralized screening of passengers for air travel, as well as the testing and onboarding of air carriers.

TC works with PS to manage potential matches against the SATA List and with air carriers to ensure compliance with the SATR.

SSC provides core information technology (IT) services to the CBSA by enhancing its functionality, connectivity with air carriers and capacity to process increasing volumes of data.

2. Engagement Purpose and Methodology

The purpose of this evaluation was to examine the implementation of the project to enhance the PPP, including the centralized screening solution, the CTN and the PPPOC. The evaluation also examined the impact of COVID-19 on the project, the effect of the project components on Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus) factors, and the plans in place to transition the enhancements made to the PPP from the project phase to the operational phase. The evaluation covered the years from the launch of the project in 2019 to March 2022. Relevant documents produced between April and November 2022 were also included to ensure up to date performance data and relevant significant developments were included.

Interviews: Twenty-nine interviews, including 4 group interviews, were conducted with 35 internal and external stakeholders.

Literature and Program Document Review: Program documents and literature (e.g. government reports, articles, academic research) were reviewed.

Performance and Financial Data: Performance data from the project to enhance the PPP was reviewed.  Program financial data was analysed.

Limitations: Performance data pre-dating the project to enhance the PPP was not available, as it was challenging to collect data under the decentralized approach. Without this data, it is difficult to fully understand the impact that the centralized screening solution and CTN have had on the program, however, key informants were able to provide anecdotal evidence of the changes that have occurred.

3. Findings

3.1 Relevance

3.1.1 Continued Need

The Government of Canada’s focus on aviation security following the terrorist attacks of September 2001 led to the development of the PPP.

Since its creation, the need for national security has evolved, but continues to exist. For instance, between 2000 and 2010, there were an estimated 20 Canadians involved in terrorism abroad. However, in 2014 there was a significant increase with over 130 Canadian extremists abroad. As a comparison, during the same time in 2014, there were 150 Americans who had travelled abroad to be involved in terrorism, despite having a population more than 10 times the size of Canada.

In 2015 through the introduction of the SATA legislation the PPP expanded to meet the increase in travel abroad, particularly to conflict areas, to engage in terrorist activities. In Addition to individuals who posed a threat to air security, those who may travel by air to commit a terrorist act at their destination were now included under the PPP.

While instances of individuals travelling to commit acts of terrorism have decreased in more recent years, the PPP remains an important national security tool. The PPP can be leveraged to protect against threats to national security, such as the growing threat of ideologically motivated violent extremism.

3.1.2 Roles and Responsibilities

PS, within its national security role and authorities, coordinates the PPP project and maintains components, such as the CTN, that benefit from being conducted by a department who is at arms-length, providing oversight to the PPP but not nominating individuals for inclusion on the SATA List. While aligned with its’ roles and responsibilities, this project stretched beyond PS’s usual policy focus, with IT project management responsibilities and the development of a public facing software application.

The CBSA, with its mandate to provide integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities, collects air carrier passenger data as a key enabler for the delivery of several programs. The addition of the centralized screening solution and subsequent efforts to enhance it, are well aligned with the roles and responsibilities of the CBSA. One area that reaches beyond the CBSA’s mandate is the collection of domestic air carrier passenger data. In this respect, the CBSA is acting as a service provider for PS.

With its responsibility for transportation regulations, policies and programs that promote safe, secure, efficient and environmentally responsible transportation, TC works with PS to manage potential matches to the SATA List and is the main point of contact for air carriers during day-to-day operations. TC is also responsible for ensuring air carrier compliance with SATA and its regulations. 

When the project ends and the various components transition to steady state program operations, there is an opportunity to review the roles and responsibilities to ensure appropriate fit once the project is complete and there has been time to assess how the ongoing program is functioning.

3.2 Passenger Protect Program Operations Centre

The PPPOC is responsible for:

• Managing the vetting of passenger information against potential matches to the SATA List and working directly with air carriers and the CBSA to manage boarding pass issuances.
• Ensuring air carriers’ compliance with the obligations to provide the prescribed information at the prescribed times, including during outages.

Many stakeholders stated that, despite delays in the initial set-up of the PPPOC caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, PPPOC has been successfully established and is meeting the needs of the program, with one key informant stating that they are a “well-oiled machine”. Internal key informants indicated that there is work to be done in ensuring air carrier compliance, but progress is being made.

Due to the 24/7/365 availability of the PPPOC, and the COVID-19 pandemic making in-office work less desirable, hiring and retaining staff has been a challenge. While TC has fully staffed the PPPOC to respond to calls from air carriers and has trained additional analysts to provide assistance or surge capacity, TC may not have the resources required to sustain heightened demand over a prolonged period of time which may be required during an unplanned outage of the centralized screening solution. It is expected that the enhanced system to maintain the availability of centralized screening will reduce the demand for surge capacity, in conjunction with new hiring and personnel management strategies.

3.3 Centralized Screening

3.3.1 Implementation

Prior to the project to enhance the PPP, air carriers were provided with the SATA List and were required to conduct their own screening before issuing boarding passes to passengers. This resulted in privacy concerns, namely that once in the hands of air carriers, there was no control over how the list was used or shared, and the potential for inconsistent screening, with air carriers employing differing methodologies. With these challenges in mind, the centralized screening solution, which shifted the responsibility for screening passengers from air carriers to the federal government, became an integral component of the project.

The centralized screening solution allows air carriers who have been tested, certified and onboarded to share passenger data with the CBSA beginning at 72 hours prior to a flight, in order to have passengers’ name, date of birth, gender and, if provided, CTN, screened against the SATA List to determine if there are matches. When an airline submits passenger data               to the system, they receive a message that indicates whether they may issue a boarding pass to that individual or whether further verification by the PPPOC is required.

The centralized screening solution has been implemented and is operational. Between November 1, 2020 and November 30, 2022, 78.7 million passengers have been vetted under the new centralized screening model. Between November 1, 2021 and November 30, 2022, 99.83% of the messages were sent within the four second service standard and 99.54% were sent within one second.

The SATR requires that all air carriers who are flying passengers to, from and within Canada, to have onboarded to the centralized screening solution by March 4, 2023. This means that air carriers must have developed an electronic communications system that allows them to transmit passenger and flight data to the centralized screening solution.

Air carriers have been working with the CBSA to test and certify their electronic communication systems. As of November 2022, all 115 eligible air carriers have been tested, certified and are now using the centralized screening solution. This represents 100% of traveller volume.

Overall, onboarding has progressed well. This is likely due to strong communication and engagement, as highlighted by key informants, both internal and external, as well as the CBSA’s prior experience working with air carriers. External key informants shared that onboarding was a smooth process as they had experience working with similar systems for other programs both within Canada and internationally.

While all eligible air carriers were able to onboard to the centralized screening solution by the deadline, there were some challenges experienced along the way.

• The COVID-19 pandemic placed financial pressures on the air industry and they were also required to comply with various unanticipated public health mandates, both of which impacted their ability to onboard. These challenges were recognized and the deadline for onboarding was extended from November 4, 2022, to March 4, 2023. Despite this extension, all eligible air carriers were able to onboard by the original deadline.
• During the onboarding phase, some air carriers chose to delay making changes to their system. Key informants indicated that this might be due to hesitations related to technical issues (e.g. outages) with the centralized screening solution, political reasons and/or having a prolonged period to comply with the regulations. Recognizing this possible challenge, PS established a communications strategy to help engage air carriers and increase onboarding rates.

3.3.2 Challenges

As an aviation security program, the PPP requires a 24/7 interactive environment to ensure the ongoing integrity of the program. Identified as a risk at the outset of the project, outages of the system have continued to be a challenge.

In 2021, there were nine unscheduled outages that impacted CBSA’s automated board/no board solution, which includes centralized screening for the PPP. These outages amounted to the system being offline for a total of approximately 63.5 hours.

Several onboarded air carriers flagged outages, both planned and unscheduled, as a significant issue. They were particularly concerned with difficulties operationalizing the outage guidance that has been provided, flight delays, and unclear communication about the causes of outages. 

In response to these challenges, an enhanced system to maintain higher availability of the centralized screening solution was added to the project. Its implementation is expected to strengthen the system’s resiliency and help maintain positive relationships with external clients and the general public. Additionally, the outage guidance was revised to make reporting requirements during an outage more manageable.

The enhancement of the system requires more time to implement than is available before the end of the project in March 2023. Air carriers will be migrated to the enhanced system post-project closeout, using CBSA resources as part of ongoing maintenance and support.

3.3.3 Benefits

Air Carriers

Centralized screening has reduced the burden of work on air carriers.

When screening passengers with the centralized screening solution, it takes less than four seconds to receive an initial result and follow-up on matches is completed in advance of the flight.

By using the same system, the consistency of screening has improved and performance data can now be collected. Privacy issues have been resolved through eliminating the need to share the SATA List with air carriers.

Program Staff

Program staff are now able to address potential matches to the SATA List as early as 72 hours prior to a flight. Most calls to resolve false name matches require less than two minutes, which key informants report is a significant improvement.

There are also fewer calls required as there are fewer false name matches as a result of the addition of unique identifiers such as date of birth and gender to the centralized screening solution, making the identification of matches more accurate.

Travellers

External key informants indicated that the implementation of the centralized screening solution has improved experiences for travellers who had previously been identified as false name matches.

“I flew for the first time with [my child] a few months ago and we had no problems. And that’s the first time we haven’t had problems in seven years. It was great.”

3.4 Canadian Travel Number

3.4.1 Implementation

Prior to the project to enhance the PPP, the need for a redress system was identified. As part of the enhancements, the redress system, known as the CTN, was added to the program. The CTN is a unique identifier that an individual can apply for if they suspect that they are experiencing delays due to being a false name match to the SATA List. A CTN prevents delays at the airport only for travellers whose name is similar to or the same as that of someone on the SATA List.

When a traveller provides a CTN while booking a flight, it will be used by the centralized screening solution as a unique identifier to help distinguish them from SATA-listed individuals, should their name, date of birth and/or gender be similar or the same as that of a listed person.

Applications can be submitted through the CTN Portal on the PS website or by mail.

Performance data included in the table below demonstrates that there was a surge in applications for CTNs when pandemic measures began to be lifted in the second half of 2021. This surge in applications caused a significant backlog and made it difficult for the program area to issue CTNs within its standard 30 business days.

• From November 18, 2020 to June 18, 2020 there was 6 child applications received and a total of 98 applications received. As well, pandemic measures began to change from this period on. From June 19, 2021 to October 31, 2021 there was 53 child applications received and a total of 864 applications received. In these two periods from November 18, 2020 to October 31, 2021 there was 34 child CTN issued and 473 total CTN issued with 57.% of applications processed within 30 business days.
• From November 1, 2021 to February 28, 2022 there was 31 child applications received and a total of 551 applications received. During the same period, there was 38 child CTN issued and 625 total CTN issues with 65.8% of applications processed within 30 business days.
• From March 1, 2022 to May 31, 2022 there was 11 child applications received and a total of 258 applications received. During the same period, there was 11 child CTN issued and 255 total CTN issued with 90% of applications processed within 30 business days.
• From June 1, 2022 to August 31 2022 there was 30 child applications received and a total of 323 applications received. During the same period, there was 25 child CTN issued and 241 total CTN issues with 98.1% of applications processed within 30 business days.
• From September 1, 2022 to November 30, 2022 there was 21 child application received and a total of 333 applications received. During the same period, there was 21 child CTN issued and 210 total CTN issued with 97.2% of applications processed within 30 business days.

As of November 30, 2022, this backlog has decreased, and processing times have significantly improved as additional staff were trained to process applications in order to clear the backlog.

3.4.2 Challenges

Initial communication to the public and industry about the CTN was unclear. Specifically, misunderstandings regarding what the CTN could and could not do were experienced. This led to an increase in applications for a CTN where a CTN would not help the individual. Communication materials, including an updated website, were created to clarify the purpose of the CTN.

Performance data suggests that changes made to the website in January 2022, were effective in more clearly conveying the intent of the CTN which appears to have led to a reduction in the number of applications. 

Number of CTN Applications per month

• Number of applications for July 2021: 160
• Number of applications for August 2021: 196
• Number of applications for September 2021: 149
• Number of applications for October 2021: 154
• Number of applications for November 2021: 168
• Number of applications for December 2021: 187
• Number of applications for January 2022: 80
• Number of applications for February 2022: 119
• Number of applications for March 2022: 104

CTNs can help an individual whose name is a close match to someone on the SATA List.

CTNs can not help when travellers experience delays at the airport for other reasons, such as lists from other countries or air carriers, security delays, immigration issues and/or airport staffing issues.

The reasons for an individual’s delays are often not made known for legal reasons, which may lead those who are frequently stopped during air travel to apply for a CTN, even if it will not help.

Clear communication is important to ensure applications for a CTN related to other types of delays do not create a strain on those responsible for processing applications.

3.4.3 Benefits

Key informants indicated that the CTN is effective in solving issues for some people. Those with a CTN who are a close or same name match to someone on the SATA List, have experienced reduced delays as a result of being cleared prior to arrival at the airport.

The number of individuals being cleared using a CTN is low as a result of the addition of unique identifiers such as date of birth and gender to the centralized screening solution. With fewer false name matches there is less reliance on the CTN to clear individuals.

“The CTN is a lot of work. There are a lot of applications. But the feeling of helping that one Canadian is very satisfying.”

As of November 30, 2022, 24 false name matches have been resolved using a CTN.

3.5 Stakeholder Engagement and GBA Plus

3.5.1 Stakeholder Engagement

The project included several stakeholders – the air industry, the travel booking industry and the public, including civil advocacy groups. Partner departments have engaged with stakeholder groups and several key informants, both internal and external, have indicated that this engagement has been successful. External key informants made note of helpful relationships with individuals at partner departments, and clear and timely communication and documentation.

One of the key stakeholders, the No Fly List Kids, was consulted throughout the implementation of the project, including testing of the CTN user portal.

While feedback was largely positive, some external key informants discussed outstanding issues that had not yet been addressed. One external key informant indicated that there were instances where air carriers had to do extra work to ensure that the appropriate data was collected at the time of booking, as the communication between the federal government and the travel booking industry was not always sufficient. Another mentioned that there were some challenges and delays in communication as a result of each department having distinct responsibilities with respect to air carriers, where individual departments were not always able to answer questions without consulting others.

COVID-19 Pandemic Impacts

While the COVID-19 pandemic presented some challenges for the project, it also provided opportunities. More specifically,

• Reduced travel allowed for the ability to test the centralized screening and CTN on smaller populations before demands increased, and
• Virtual meetings allowed for better participation for smaller and international air carriers who may not have been able to participate to the same extent had meetings been in person.

3.5.2 Addressing Stigma in the PPP

Initial reports show that the PPP contributed to feelings of stigmatization for individuals who were falsely matched to the SATA List by subjecting them to additional screening during the air travel process. These challenges while travelling impacted the ease with which individuals were able to visit family, earn a living and go on vacation. These experiences affected the dignity of the individuals who were flagged and contributed to the normalization of Islamophobia.

The implementation of centralized screening and the CTN has decreased the opportunity for travellers to be impacted by biases.

While exact numbers are unknown, key informants indicated that the number of individuals who are being delayed at the airport or publicly pulled aside as a result of a false name match to the SATA List has decreased with the addition of unique identifiers, such as date of birth, gender and CTN, to the screening criteria, as well as the practice of addressing potential matches before travellers arrive at the airport.

Public advocacy organizations have expressed a need for data to ensure that systemic discrimination is not occurring within the PPP. PS is inquiring into releasing disaggregated data for the program, but it is a challenge as there are limits on what information can legally be shared. PS is working to develop an appropriate methodology for collecting and sharing data to the public and this should remain a priority.

3.6 Project Delivery

3.6.1 Governance

While the PPP has pre-established governance bodies responsible for the management of the program, three new executive-level committees and six working groups were established to support the management of the project and maintain partner department engagement (Annex A). These governance bodies held consistent meetings, with very few exceptions, that were attended by all partner departments. Items moved, as necessary, through the executive committees for review and approval.

When the project comes to an end and transitions to steady state program operations, these governance committees will sunset and the pre-established program governance bodies will manage the enhancements.

In particular, the Passenger Protect Advisory Group has recently evolved from an operationally based committee (managing the SATA List) to a committee that has become increasingly strategic. Despite this evolution, the group may be used to discuss issues of a more operational nature as needed once the project governance sunsets.

In addition to formal governance committees, informal relationships, communication and collaboration among partner departments was collegial, and enabled the success of the project through knowledge exchange and shared outcomes. Key informants echoed this finding, sharing that partner departments worked well together and supported each other when needed.

While relationships were strong throughout the project, turnover in positions could make more formal governance structures necessary going forward.

3.6.2 Best Practices and Lesson Learned

A few challenges arose during the implementation of the project, however, they were well managed and solutions were put in place to mitigate them. Some of the challenges experienced and their solutions are listed below.

• Confusion about the purpose of the CTN was resolved by revising communications material, including the website.
• Outages of the centralized screening solution will be addressed through the development and implementation of an enhanced system to maintain higher availability and a regulatory change to decrease reporting demands during outages.
• Challenges with resources, particularly staffing certain positions within the PPPOC at TC, were mitigated by adjusting hiring strategies.

The success of the project, particularly the ability to identify challenges and implement solutions, has been attributed to the robust governance structure and collaboration and engagement among project partners. This governance structure, as a best practice, is already being applied to another PS program.

3.7 Transition Plan

The project to enhance the PPP will be completed on March 31, 2023. Accordingly, the centralized screening solution, CTN and PPPOC will be integrated into the regular operations of the program.

Most key informants anticipate the transition will be smooth given that many components of the project are already in the operational phase.

While the project is expected to be completed on time, additional time will be required to migrate onboarded air carriers to the enhanced system to maintain higher availability of the centralized screening solution. This work will be completed by the CBSA. 

Each of the partner departments has plans in place for the transition.

• For PS, a business transformation strategy and a working group have been established to prepare for the transition.
• Components of the project for the CBSA would be aligned with other similar programs and maintenance teams have been selected.
• Key informants indicated that for TC, the main transition has already occurred, as the PPPOC is operational.

Many key informants are confident that there are sufficient resources and processes in place to support the enhanced program after it has transitioned from the project phase to the operational phase. However, some key informants expressed uncertainty about certain aspects of the program going forward, which include:

Roles & Responsibilities - While roles and responsibilities were clearly delineated throughout the project, following project completion, there is an opportunity to review roles and responsibilities to ensure best fit.

Governance - Some key informants were concerned with how program issues would continue to be addressed with project governance committees sunsetting.

Resources - Some key informants expressed uncertainty about the availability of resources for components of the project post-transition. They were particularly concerned about:

• ongoing funding for project components that were not initially planned for in the Treasury Board Submission, particularly the enhanced system to maintain higher availability of the centralized screening solution,
• increasing contract costs due to inflation, and
• the costs of maintaining the CTN application, which were initially underestimated.

Conclusions

As threats to national security continue to exist and evolve, there is a continued need for the PPP. The project to enhance the PPP has introduced new elements that have improved the effectiveness and efficiency of the program.

This horizontal project was implemented in an efficient and effective way in large part due to a robust governance structure, clearly defined roles and strong communication between partner departments. The governance structure was mentioned as a best practice by several key informants and is being used as a model for another project within PS.

These strengths ensured that project components, the centralized screening solution, the CTN and the PPPOC, were effectively implemented and issues that arose were appropriately addressed. This includes the development of an enhanced system to maintain higher availability of the centralized screening solution.

The project will be completed in March 2023 and the enhancements made will be transitioned to the operational phase. Plans are in place for this transition and, given several components are already in their operational steady state, most key informants expect the transition to be smooth.

Centralized screening has reduced privacy issues, enhanced national security and decreased the number of false name matches, improving air travel for individuals who had previously been impacted by SATA-related delays and stigmatization.

CTNs are being issued and have helped individuals who were false name matches to the SATA List. While the CTN provides an added layer of assurance for individuals, the addition of other unique identifiers to the centralized screen solution has resulted in an overall reduction of false name matches to the SATA List.

The PPPOC has been successfully established and is meeting the needs of the program. Work to ensure air carrier compliance with the SATR is ongoing.

5. Recommendations

The Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security, PS should:

1. Work with partner departments to conduct a review of roles and responsibilities, program governance and resources within a year of the completion of the project, in order to ensure sustainability of the program following the addition of the enhancements.

6. Management Action Plan

Recommendation: Work with partner departments to conduct a review of roles and responsibilities, program governance and resources within a year of the completion of the project, in order to ensure sustainability of the program following the addition of the enhancements.

Action Planned: The Passenger Protect Office’s policy team will identify the respective roles, responsibilities, program governance and resources of each department in order to maintain the program’s steady state identified in the transition plan within the project closeout report (RDIMS 3963865).

To ensure the sustainability of the agreed transition plan within the project closeout report, partners will conduct a review of the program’s state of roles, responsibilities, governance and resources approximately 6 months after project closure.

Planned Completion Date: September 2023

Annex A: Project Governance Committees

Image Description

The governance structure for the project to enhance the Passenger Protect Program (PPP) includes the Senior Advisory Committee, which is chaired by the Associate Deputy Minister of Public Safety Canada (PS). It also includes the Senior Advisory Board, chaired by the Director General of the National Security Policy Directorate at Public Safety which reports to the Senior Advisory Committee. Additionally it includes, the Project Management Board, chaired by the Director of the Passenger Protect Office at PS, which reports to the Senior Advisory Board.

Included in the governance structure are five working groups and one sub-working group. These are the IM/IT Working Group on Redress, The PPP Air Carrier Onboarding Working Group, the Air Industry Working Group / Air Industry Technical Working Group which includes the Outages Sub-Working Group, The PPP Operations Working Group and the Risk, Issues and Change Management Working Group.

Date modified:

2023-08-16