Foreign Interference and Hostile Activities of State Actors
Classification: Unclassified
Branch/Agency: Organization Name
Proposed Response:
- As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, Canada continues to be targeted by foreign states, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), seeking to advance their political, economic and security interests to the detriment of Canada’s.
- While the PRC is an important partner for Canada in many areas of Canadian society, it also possesses and employs a powerful security and intelligence apparatus to advance its strategic objectives around the world.
- The threat posed by the PRC, including malign activities targeting our democratic institutions, communities and economic prosperity, remains a concern for our security and intelligence agencies.
- As the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians has highlighted, the threat that the PRC represents to Canada and our interests is a growing concern.
- The PRC has the capability to conduct foreign interference activities in Canada by applying pressure and influence, and continues to do so with increasing assertiveness.
- Notably, in 2017, the PRC passed its National Intelligence Law that requires Chinese organizations and citizens anywhere in the world to assist with state intelligence work.
- In December 2020, I took an important step by publicly outlining the threats related to foreign interference, and the critical work of the security and intelligence community in a letter addressed to all Members of the House of Commons. This letter has also been tabled in the House of Commons.
- The Government of Canada does not tolerate these harmful activities and applies a whole-of-government approach to countering foreign interference.
- While I cannot speak in detail about operational matters today, I can assure you that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) are actively investigating threats of espionage and foreign interference in Canada.
- CSIS and the RCMP also engage with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians on these important matters in a classified setting.
- We will also continue to work closely with our partners, inside and outside the security and intelligence community and with non-federal stakeholders, to look for new and innovative ways to enhance our approach.
- There is no greater responsibility for the Government than to keep its citizens and communities safe. While we cannot always make our actions known to the public, Canadians can be assured that their safety and security will always be at the heart of our approach.
Operation Fox Hunt
- We are aware that foreign states, including the PRC, attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals in Canada or their relatives in Canada or abroad.
- While in some cases they may do this in pursuit of anti-corruption efforts or to bring criminals to justice, these tactics can also be used to silence dissent, pressure political opponents and instil a general fear of state power on Canadian soil. One such example includes what is known as Operation Fox Hunt.
- The PRC uses Operation Fox Hunt to identify and try to repatriate individuals to China who they allege are corrupt. However, the program is widely believed to have also been used as a means to stifle regime criticism. In light of this, Canada has imposed increasingly stringent criteria on this program since 2015.
- Whenever individuals in Canada are subjected to intimidation or manipulation by foreign states or their proxies, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians and will not be tolerated.
- Those targeted by these activities may be unaware that they can report these activities to Canadian authorities. Any Canadian who feels threatened or intimidated by a person acting on behalf of a foreign country is strongly encouraged to contact their local police at the earliest possible opportunity. These concerns will be dealt with in a serious and appropriate manner.
- In addition, both CSIS and the RCMP have telephone and online reporting mechanisms for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including foreign interference.
- Canadians should be assured that our security and intelligence community remains vigilant and is prepared to take appropriate action against these threats.
Transfer of Canadian-Made Technology and Intellectual Property to Foreign States
- Canada’s abundance of natural resources, advanced technology, human talent, and expertise makes us a world leader in many sectors. We have key allies with whom we enjoy close economic, security, and defence relationships. All these factors make Canada and Canadian companies a target.
- In addition, as the Internet evolves, more personal information is available online. Unfortunately, this has drawn the interest of various threat actors who take advantage of Canada’s openness to pursue their own interests.
- The PRC possesses sophisticated technological and technical abilities that can be used to acquire sensitive information.
- The transfer of Canadian-made technology, intellectual property and sensitive data to foreign states, like the PRC, is of particular concern as it can lead to improvements in the military and intelligence capabilities of foreign states. This, in turn, can negatively impact the national security of Canada or its allies, and potentially result in reputational harm to Canadian entities as well.
- Foreign actors, including the PRC, particularly covet our advanced industrial and technological capabilities. These sectors include, but are not limited to, biopharmaceuticals and health, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, ocean technology and aerospace, all of which the Director of CSIS has recently publicly cited as facing particularly severe threat activity.
- These and other technologies being developed or produced in Canada may be sensitive from a national security perspective because they are “dual-use” in nature, meaning they have both a civilian and military application that could provide important advantages to foreign states like the PRC.
- CSIS is aware that foreign talent recruitment programs are used to advance the economic and strategic objectives of states at the expense of Canada’s national interests, including by China.
- Such efforts may result in lost jobs and expertise, a loss of Canadian government-funded research, and a diminished competitive global advantage.
- CSIS has observed persistent and sophisticated state-sponsored threat activity for many years now, and continues to see a rise in the frequency and sophistication of this threat activity.
- This threat has unfortunately caused significant harm to Canadian companies, and jeopardizes Canada’s knowledge-based economy.
- Our security and intelligence agencies will continue their efforts to safeguard Canadian-made technology, intellectual property and sensitive data from transfer to foreign states, like the PRC, as part of our whole-of-government approach to addressing economic-based national security threats.
Responsive Lines
Threats to Democracy
- Certain state actors, including the PRC, seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s democratic system to further their own national interests, or to discredit Canada’s democratic institutions.
- We are aware that threat actors, have sought to clandestinely target politicians, political parties, electoral nomination processes and media outlets to influence public opinion and ultimately advance their geopolitical interests.
- Our security and intelligence agencies will continue to support the integrated government response by monitoring and reporting on threats, and providing advice to protect our democracy. They also work with international partners by engaging with allies and sharing information to collectively address these global threats.
- Due to operational sensitivities, I cannot speak to specific activities related to this issue.
United Front Work Department
- There has been significant reporting in the media and elsewhere about the United Front Work Department. This reporting suggests that United Front Work Department activities include co-opting elites and facilitating espionage.
- While I am unable to discuss this in greater detail due to operational sensitivities, our security and intelligence community is actively taking measures to reduce this threat. For example, CSIS conducts investigations under the CSIS Act and the RCMP can also investigate with a view of laying charges under the Criminal Code.
Disinformation and COVID-19
- The increased use of the Internet and social media by threat actors represents a unique challenge for the security and intelligence community.
- Foreign interference, including state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, can have corrosive impacts over time, such as eroding trust in our democratic institutions and causing confusion about government policies and decisions. Threat actors also used the pandemic as an opportunity to spread disinformation online.
- Our security and intelligence agencies will continue to support the integrated government response by monitoring and reporting on threats, and providing advice to protect our democracy. They also work with international partners by engaging with allies and sharing information to collectively address these global threats.
Foreign Interference During 2019 Federal Election
- Democratic institutions and processes around the world, including elections, are valuable targets for hostile activities by state actors. Canada is not immune to these threat activities.
- In the period leading up to the 2019 Federal Election, the Government of Canada initiated a number of measures to protect Canadians from foreign interference, and ensure the integrity of our democratic process.
- As part of these efforts, CSIS actively investigated a number of threats across Canada related to the 2019 Federal Elections and provided classified briefings on its threat assessments and investigations to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel.
- As members of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, CSIS and the RCMP also worked closely with partners to coordinate our efforts against foreign interference by raising awareness and assessing threats, and preparing the government’s response to them.
- While I cannot provide more detail, CSIS uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference in Canada’s democratic institutions or processes by a foreign state.
Economic-Based Threats to National Security and Foreign Direct Investment
- The Investment Canada Act is both country and sector agnostic, and provides for the review of significant investments by non-Canadians to ensure overall net benefit to Canada, as well as providing for the review of foreign investments of any size for national security concerns.
- In the current economic environment shaped by COVID-19, the Government of Canada is applying increased scrutiny to all foreign direct investments into Canadian businesses that are vital to public health and the security of supply of critical goods and services to Canadians or to the Government of Canada.
- Further, the Government of Canada will also subject all foreign investments by state-owned investors, or private investors assessed as being closely tied to foreign governments, to enhanced scrutiny.
- These transparent measures will ensure that Canada continues to welcome foreign investment, while safeguarding the country from investments that could be injurious to our national security, including our ability to respond to COVID-19.
- The Government of Canada will take action where necessary to ensure that foreign investment never compromises our national security.
CSIS Act Modernization
- Our security and intelligence agencies have the tools they need to keep Canadians safe. In 2017 the government undertook one of the most significant updates to our national security legislation in decades.
- As a result, in 2019, CSIS gained important new powers such as the ability to collect datasets, as well as protections for CSIS officers engaged in essential intelligence collection activities.
- Notwithstanding these important and necessary changes to CSIS’ authorities, threats to Canada’s security continue to evolve in ways that cannot always be anticipated.
- We are always evaluating the tools and authorities that our national security agencies need to help keep Canadians safe while respecting their fundamental rights.
Background:
Foreign interference is understood as hostile activity undertaken by foreign states that is purposely covert, malign, clandestine and deceptive. It can include threats, harassment and intimidation. These activities can be directed at Canadians, or residents of Canada, or against Canadian institutions to advance their strategic interests at the expense of our national interest and values.
Through its mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, CSIS has seen multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canadian institutions and communities. The scope of potential foreign interference activities can be broad, encompassing a range of techniques that are familiar to intelligence agencies. These include: human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign influenced media, and the use of sophisticated cyber tools.
The PRC is one of the main actors perpetrating foreign interference and hostile activities in Canada. At previous committee hearings, members of the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations have inquired about issues including: elite capture, the harassment and intimidation of communities, Operation Fox Hunt and the PRC’s 2017 National Intelligence Law.
Your open letter to all Members of Parliament, outlining the threat of foreign interference, and what the Government is doing to address it, was sent on December 18, 2020 in response to the motion introduced in the House of Commons by Mr. Michael Chong (Wellington—Halton Hills) that was passed on November 18, 2020. The motion reads: That, given that (i) the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, is threatening Canada’s national interest and our values, including Canadians of Chinese origin within Canada’s borders, (ii) it is essential that Canada have a strong and principled foreign policy backed by action in concert with its allies, the House call upon the government to: (a) make a decision on Huawei’s involvement in Canada’s 5G network within 30 days of the adoption of this motion; and (b) develop a robust plan, as Australia has done, to combat China’s growing foreign operations here in Canada and its increasing intimidation of Canadians living in Canada, and table it within 30 days of the adoption of this motion.
The letter pointed to the PRC as being particularly active in Canada. It was also tabled in the House of Commons on January 25, 2021.
Operation Fox Hunt
The PRC and other foreign states attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies. These states may use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as trusted agents to assist them in foreign interference activity on Canadian soil.
While some states may attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals in the name of fighting corruption or to bring criminals to justice, these tactics can also be used as cover for silencing dissent, pressuring political opponents and instilling a general fear of state power no matter where a person is located. The PRC’s Operation Fox Hunt is one such example. The PRC uses this program as a means to identify and try to repatriate to China individuals who they allege are corrupt. The PRC has conducted this operation in Canada since 2014. Initially, Canada worked with Chinese officials to support their investigations, however, increasingly stringent criteria on the PRC investigators involved in this program have been added, beginning in 2015.
PRC’s National Intelligence Law
CSIS is increasingly concerned about the threat that the PRC represents to Canada and Canadian interests. The PRC has the capacity to conduct foreign interference activities in Canada by applying pressure and influence in a clandestine and deceptive manner to pursue its strategic objectives.
On June 28, 2017, the National People’s Congress passed the National Intelligence Law which codifies existing practice and adds significant new principles. Under the National Intelligence Law, citizens have a duty to support, assist and cooperate with state intelligence work.
United Front Work Department
The United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Chinese Communist Party is used by the PRC to stifle criticism, infiltrate foreign political parties, diaspora communities, universities and multinational corporations. The UFWD’s importance to the Chinese Communist Party has grown in recent years under President Xi, as 40,000 new staff have been added.
Reporting Foreign Interference
When foreign states target members of Canadian communities, these individuals, for various reasons, may not have the means to protect themselves or do not know they can report these activities to Canadian authorities. The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can force individuals to submit to foreign interference.
When CSIS is informed of allegations of foreign interference, it uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise and respond to the threat, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation. Furthermore, criminal activity that is reported to law enforcement and that involves a national security nexus is investigated by the RCMP.
Transfer of Canadian-Made Technology and Intellectual Property to Foreign States
As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, foreign threat actors have long targeted Canada and Canadians in order to advance their interests at our expense. Canadian companies, in almost all sectors of our economy, have been targeted. They have been compromised and have suffered losses from human- and cyber-enabled threats. In particular, Canada’s research and development, and advanced technology sectors, face particularly severe threat activity.
There has also been an increase in the exploitation of cyber tools to steal sensitive information, conduct ransomware attacks and cause disruption. State cyber actors will continue to target sensitive and proprietary data that resides on Canadian networks, and continue to deploy highly-creative tradecraft.
Given the threat environment, Budget 2019 made investments to safeguard against economic-based national security threats, including the ability to “safeguard against theft of our Canadian intellectual property and Canadian-made technologies, and against Canada’s research and development activities being used as ‘back-door’ channels to obtain sensitive Canadian technologies”.
To effectively safeguard against these threats, there is a need for a government-wide understanding of sensitive technologies with national security implications, and a lasting approach to their identification. As such, Public Safety Canada launched the interdepartmental Sensitive Technology Working Group in 2019 to bring together technology and national security experts from across government to develop a coherent, made-in-Canada approach to understanding the nexus between technology and national security.
Threats to Democracy
Democratic institutions and processes, including elections, are vulnerable and valuable targets for hostile activities by state actors. Canada is not immune to these threat activities. Certain state actors, including the PRC, seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s democratic system to further their own national interests, or to discredit Canada’s democratic institutions to erode public confidence. For example, state actors have sought to clandestinely target politicians, political parties, electoral nomination processes, and media outlets in order to influence the Canadian public and democratic processes.
The Government of Canada’s security and intelligence community is combatting these threats within their respective mandates. CSIS is working closely with other government partners, inside and outside the security and intelligence community, to address clandestine, deceptive or threatening interference activities that can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes. For example, CSIS has longstanding investigations into foreign interference threat activities targeting democratic processes and institutions across Canada. The provision of CSIS intelligence and assessments to senior levels of government allows for informed decision making when responding to and developing policies to address these threats. Likewise, the RCMP has a broad, multi-faceted mandate that allows it to investigate, and prevent foreign interference drawing upon various legislation.
Disinformation and COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic has provided foreign threat actors with unique opportunities to advance their objectives, to the detriment of Canada’s national interest. State-sponsored information manipulation utilized by certain regimes to reshape or undermine the rules-based-international order is of particular concern. These states are manipulating and using disinformation to sow doubt on the origins of the virus and the means required to counter it; to discredit democratic responses to COVID-19 while casting their own as superior; and to erode confidence in democratic values and human rights. They are also leveraging ideologically-motivated fringe narratives and conspiracies to polarize societies, undermine trust in democratically-elected governments, and deflect blame for mishandling the pandemic.
It is important to note that disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices, including information on the COVID-19 pandemic. State-sponsored disinformation campaigns are an example of foreign interference.
Information manipulation, in particular disinformation, has been a subject of international collaboration in the context of COVID-19. Canada has discussed the threat and possible responses across a variety of bilateral and multilateral engagements and fora. For example, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism has enabled real-time information and assessment sharing, as well as the coordination of strategies to counter COVID-19 related disinformation. You represent Canada at the Five-Country Ministerial, an annual forum where Five Eyes security ministers meet to discuss opportunities for collaboration and information sharing on various national security issues, including foreign interference. These discussions often include the sharing of respective approaches to shared issues, and the coordination of a cohesive Five Eyes responses.
Canadian security and intelligence partners are collaborating to share information and to leverage their mandates in an effort to disrupt hostile activities by state actors, including by leveraging the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, composed of officials from CSE, CSIS, RCMP and GAC.
Foreign Interference During 2019 Elections
In an effort to counter foreign interference against the 2019 Federal Election, the Government created the SITE Task Force. As members of the SITE Task Force, CSIS was involved in efforts to raise awareness and assess foreign interference threats against the 2019 federal elections, and the RCMP provided law enforcement expertise. The SITE Task Force remains after the 2019 Federal Election, as threats to democratic institutions, such as foreign interference and disinformation, have not abated.
Economic-Based Threats to National Security and Foreign Direct Investment
Chinese investment into Canada has fallen in recent years, consistent with its global outward investment trends. While the Investment Canada Act (ICA) is country-agnostic, Canada has taken action against Chinese state-owned investment under the national security provisions of the Act; this has included publicly noted actions to prevent the acquisition of Canadian companies Aecon in 2018 and TMAC Resources in 2020.
CSIS is a prescribed investigative body under the national security provisions of the ICA and conducts investigative efforts related to national security concerns arising from foreign investment. CSIS works with partners to provide advice in support of this process. The RCMP also participates in the national security review of foreign investment process under the ICA, to offer a law enforcement perspective, and to assess if there are potential criminal linkages to certain foreign investment proposals. The process may result in a Governor in Council divesture order or impose mitigation conditions on investments that would be injurious to Canada’s national security. As reported in the 2018-19 ICA Annual Report, for the four fiscal years 2015-16 to 2018-19 the Governor in Council issued eight 25.4 final orders: six blocking or ordering the foreign investor to divest of its investment and two imposing conditions that protect national security while allowing those investments to proceed.
CSIS Act Modernization
CSIS has two main collection authorities: section 12 which relates to threats to the security of Canada (e.g. terrorism, espionage, foreign interference); and section 16 which relates to the intentions and capabilities of foreign states (e.g. foreign intelligence), and is undertaken at the request of either the Minister of National Defence, or the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Legislative History
The CSIS Act has been amended several times in recent years to update CSIS’ authorities as threats evolved including:
- 2014
- C-44: Section 12 amended to clarify that CSIS can carry out section 12 investigations anywhere in the world and not just in Canada.
- 2015
- C-51: Addition of the threat reduction power which allows CSIS to take action to reduce threats under section 12.1, including a warranted power to limit the exercise of a Canadian’s Charter rights in certain circumstances.
- 2019
Contacts:
Prepared by: NSOD
Approved by: Dominic Rochon, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, 613-990-4976 (pending)
- Date modified: