Parliamentary Committee Notes: Foreign Interference

Date: May 2, 2022
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Fully releasable (ATIP)? Yes
Branch / Agency: NCSB/PS

Proposed Response:

• In recent years, Canada has seen an increase in the frequency and sophistication of foreign interference, perpetrated by state actors such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation and others seeking to advance their political, economic and security interests to the detriment of Canada’s.
• The Government of Canada remains committed to combatting foreign interference by any foreign state seeking to harm Canada, to protecting our citizens and communities targeted by hostile state actors, to safeguarding our democratic institutions and to promoting economic security.
• We continue to work closely with our security and intelligence partners, both inside and outside the federal government, domestically and abroad, to counter foreign interference activities.
• Protecting the safety and security of Canadians will always be at the heart of our approach.

Threats to Democracy

• Foreign interference by state actors erodes trust in our democratic institutions and stokes tensions about government policies and decisions.
• While Canada’s democratic institutions and processes are strong and resilient, our agencies will continue to support an integrated government response by monitoring and reporting on threats, and providing advice to ensure continued protection our democracy.
• As part of these efforts, CSIS investigates threats, advises government and, as necessary, may take measures to reduce threats to Canada’s security including those sponsored by foreign states.
• The RCMP also plays an important role by investigating criminal offences related to foreign interference, including those targeting Canada’s democratic institutions and processes.

Threats to Communities

• We are aware that certain foreign states attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals in Canada or their relatives abroad.
• While some states, may ostensibly do so in pursuit of anti-corruption efforts, these tactics can also be used to silence dissent, pressure political opponents and instil fear of foreign state reach on Canadian soil.
• When individuals in Canada are subjected to intimidation or manipulation by foreign states or their proxies, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of communities and individuals in Canada, and will never be tolerated.
• The RCMP investigates illegal activities relating to state-backed threats targeting communities and members of the public, including harassment, intimidation, and surveillance, as they constitute a threat to public safety and national security.
• If a member of the public is in immediate danger from a person suspected of acting on behalf of a foreign state, please contact your local police. If a member of the public suspects criminal foreign interference activities that do not pose an immediate threat to life, they should report it to the RCMP through the multiple channels available, including the National Security Information Network web portal.

If Pressed on Disinformation and Misinformation in the Context of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

• The ongoing events of the past few months have reinforced that the international community is strongest when it acts together in defence of our shared values.
• We have seen Russian narratives and disinformation used to try to justify the invasion of Ukraine, undermine the Ukrainian government and delegitimize Western responses.
• At the same time, the Russian government is imposing unprecedented restrictions within Russia on independent media, blocking social media platforms (deeming these organizations “terrorists”) and criminalizing opposition to the war in Ukraine, in an effort to control its domestic information space and mislead Russian audiences about the war.
• It is important to remember that Canada is not immune from the threat of these types of foreign interference. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine will have deep and long-term geopolitical consequences, and directly threatens the rules-based international order.
• Canada will continue to condemn the overt and covert use of disinformation not only by the Russian Government and its affiliated media and proxies, but by any foreign state that seeks to threaten global democracy and the safety and security of Canadians.
• In the recently announced Budget 2022, the Government of Canada has committed to providing $13.4 million over five years, starting in 2022-23 to renew and expand the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism – an international forum that addresses foreign threats to democracy, including state-sponsored disinformation.
• Canada’s security and intelligence community also remains vigilant against the potential threat of Russian foreign interference against Canadians and Canadian interests in retaliation for our support for Ukraine.

If Pressed on Election Interference

• Democratic institutions and processes around the world, including elections, are targets for foreign interference. Canada is not immune to these threat activities.
• Over the course of the 2021 Federal Election, CSIS and the RCMP worked closely with partners as members of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force to coordinate efforts against foreign interference by raising awareness, assessing threats, and preparing the government’s response to them.
• While I cannot provide more detail regarding specific threat activity observed during the 2021 Federal Election, I can assure Canadians that our security and intelligence agencies investigate allegations of interference in Canada’s democratic institutions or processes by a foreign state, in accordance with their mandated authorities, and that the RCMP investigates foreign actor interference, further to its mandate.

If Pressed on a Foreign Agent Registry

• The Government of Canada continues to consider new and innovative ways to enhance the measures we have in place to counter foreign interference.
• We are always looking to learn from the experiences of international partners to see what may be advisable or possible in Canada.
• No decision has been made on whether to pursue something similar in Canada or how such a proposal would work in a Canadian context.

If Pressed on Connections between Foreign Interference and the “Freedom Convoy” protests

• Canadians have Charter protected freedoms of thought, belief, opinion and expression, as well as the freedoms to associate and peacefully assemble. While frustrations with COVID-19 are understandable, they do not justify violence or intimidation in any form.
• Security and Intelligence agencies have seen certain ideologically motivated violent extremist groups using the COVID-19 pandemic to spread propaganda, exacerbate social tensions, encourage criminal or violent actions, and undermine trust in public institutions and government.
• We know that the COVID-19 pandemic has also provided foreign threat actors with unique opportunities to advance their objectives, to the detriment of Canada’s national interest. This includes state-sponsored disinformation and the leveraging of ideologically-motivated fringe narratives and conspiracies to polarize societies, undermine trust in democratically-elected governments, and deflect blame for mishandling of the pandemic.
• We also know that much of the extremism identified in the “Freedom Convoy” protests and other similar movements has been fuelled by misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda through social media and other online platforms.
• While I cannot comment on specific cases, intelligence reporting or evidence linked to foreign interference, the Government of Canada will leverage the full range of tools at its disposal to investigate and counter these harmful activities.
• Our agencies will continue to support an integrated government response by monitoring and reporting on threats, and providing robust advice to protect our democracy.

 Financial Implications:

• NIL

Background

Foreign interference is understood as hostile activities undertaken by foreign states, or its proxies, that is purposely covert, malign, clandestine and deceptive. It can include threats, harassment and intimidation. Foreign states leverage these activities to advance their strategic interests including: seeking geopolitical influence, economic advancement, revision of the rules-based international order, domestic stability, and military advantage. These activities can be directed at Canadians, or residents of Canada, or against Canadian institutions to advance their strategic interests at the expense of our national interests and values.

Through its mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, CSIS has seen multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canadian institutions and communities. As well, the RCMP is aware that illegal state-backed activities are committed against Canadians and Canadian interests, and investigates these activities further to its mandate. The scope of potential foreign interference activities can be broad, encompassing a range of techniques that are familiar to intelligence agencies. These include human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign influenced media and disinformation campaigns, and the use of sophisticated cyber tools.

Several reports have highlighted the threat of foreign interference in Canada. For example, in its 2020 Public Report, released in April 2021, CSIS stated that espionage and foreign interference activity observed over the past year had reached levels not seen since the Cold War. The report also notes that in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, espionage and foreign interference threats continue to persist and, in some areas, are increasing. Espionage and foreign-influenced activities are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside of Canada, and directly threaten Canada’s national security and strategic interests.

Furthermore, the 2019 Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) outlined foreign interference activities, including the targeting of Canadian institutions by threat actors. The NSICOP (2019) report pointed to Russia and China as being particularly active in Canada and made a number of recommendations for Canada to bolster its response to the threat of foreign interference. The 2020 NSICOP annual report highlighted the significance of this issue to Canada, citing that Russia continues to exploit Russian diaspora and compatriot organizations in Canada. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) also notes that Russia is primarily responsible for this espionage, using clandestine cyber operations to steal proprietary data.

Canada monitors the international information ecosystem for indicators of foreign state sponsored disinformation and is aware of Russia’s long-running disinformation campaigns. Russia’s use of disinformation created a pretext for its illegal invasion of Ukraine and its continued manipulation of information to blur the facts and try to build support for its illegal invasion. Canada is working with a range of partners across industry, civil society, and academia, to support ongoing efforts to identify and counter Russian disinformation around the crisis and build societal resilience to disinformation in Ukraine and globally. The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM), established in 2018 and led by Canada on an ongoing basis, is a forum for addressing foreign threats to democracy, including state-sponsored disinformation. We are also collaborating with international partners through a host of other forums, including NATO, the Media Freedom Coalition, and the Freedom Online Coalition. Through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs), Canada supported over $4.2M in programming between 2019 - 2021, and the Prime Minister recently announced $3M to build Ukrainian capacity to strategically communicate and enhance the resilience of Ukrainian communities to disinformation. We are also taking steps to remove Russian propaganda and false narratives from Canadian airwaves. The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) disallowed the distribution of RT (formerly known as Russia Today) by Canadian television service providers as its programming is not in the public interest and is not consistent with Canada’s broadcasting standards.

Threats to Democracy

Canada has observed state-sponsored information manipulation employed by certain regimes, including Russia, aimed at reshaping or undermining the rules-based-international order. Disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices including information on the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Government of Canada’s security and intelligence community is combatting these threats within their respective mandates. CSIS is working closely with other government partners, inside and outside the security and intelligence community, to address clandestine, deceptive or threatening interference activities that can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes. For example, CSIS has longstanding investigations into foreign interference threat activities targeting democratic processes and institutions across Canada. The provision of CSIS intelligence and assessments to senior levels of government allows for informed decision-making when responding to and developing policies to address these threats. Likewise, the RCMP has a broad, multifaceted mandate that allows it to investigate, disrupt, and prevent foreign interference drawing upon authorities enshrined in various legislation.

Although Canada’s electoral system is strong, threat actors have sought to target its politicians, political parties, elections, and media outlets in order to manipulate the Canadian public and interfere with Canada’s democracy. CSIS delivers briefings to protect against this threat, with the aim of promoting awareness of hostile activities by state actors and strengthening security practices.

Information manipulation, in particular disinformation, has been a subject of international collaboration. Canada has discussed the threat and possible responses across a variety of bilateral and multilateral engagements and fora. For example, you represent Canada at the Five-Country Ministerial (FCM), an annual forum where Five Eyes security ministers meet to discuss opportunities for collaboration and information sharing on various national security issues, including foreign interference. These discussions include the sharing of respective approaches to shared issues, and the coordination of a cohesive Five Eyes response. During the 2021 FCM, ministers committed to working together, along with like-minded countries through multilateral fora, to share experiences and report on progress to build collective resilience in the academic, research and development sectors against foreign interference and the unwanted transfer of knowledge.

Threats to Communities

China, Russia and other foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies. These states may also use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as trusted agents to assist them in foreign interference activity on Canadian soil.

While certain states may attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals in order to pursue anti-corruption measures or enforce other laws in their domestic legal frameworks, these tactics can also be used as a cover for silencing dissent, pressuring political opponents and instilling a general fear of state power no matter where the individual is located.

When foreign states target members of Canadian communities, these individuals, for various reasons, may not have the means to protect themselves or know that they can report these activities to Canadian authorities. The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can force individuals to submit to foreign interference.

These activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians. When CSIS is informed of any allegations of foreign interference, it uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise and respond to the threat, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation. Furthermore, criminal activity with a suspected nexus to a foreign state is investigated by the RCMP.

“Freedom Convoy” Protests and Other Similar Movements

There remains the potential for foreign actors to leverage social cleavages to advance their own state objectives. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies continue to monitor and assess the situation. Threats could include, for example:

• Funds provided at the direction of a foreign state with the goal of engaging in foreign interference activities in Canada; or
• If the contributors (foreign or domestic) are knowingly donating in support of an act of serious violence that is ideologically, religiously or politically motivated.

Regarding funding provided to the Convoy, where funds are provided in support of activities that constitute threats to the security of Canada, and where efforts to fund and finance activities are for the purpose of obtaining political gain, including the destruction or overthrow of the government through violence, this would constitute a national security issue and would fall under the jurisdiction of the RCMP, with  assistance from CSIS.

Contacts:

Prepared by: NCSB/NSOD
Approved by: Dominic Rochon, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, 613-990-4976

Date modified:

2023-05-11