Parliamentary Committee Notes: Foreign Interference for Eastern Europe
Date: May 5, 2022
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Fully releasable (ATIP)? Yes
Branch / Agency: NCSB/PS
Proposed Response:
- The Government of Canada remains deeply concerned with the increase in the frequency and sophistication of foreign interference by state actors, such as those observed in Eastern Europe, seeking to advance their political, economic and security interests to the detriment of Canada’s.
- Foreign interference erodes trust in democratic institutions and stokes tensions about government policies and decisions.
- As outlined in my mandate letter from the Prime Minister, the Government of Canada is committed to combatting foreign interference, protecting our democratic institutions and promoting economic security.
- We continue to work closely with our security and intelligence partners, both inside and outside the federal government, domestically and abroad, to closely monitor the evolving threat posed by foreign interference emanating from Eastern Europe, and to find new and innovative ways to enhance our approach to counter foreign interference by state actors.
- While we cannot always make our actions known to the public, Canadians can be assured that their safety and security will always be at the heart of our approach.
If Pressed on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
- The events of the past few months have reinforced that the international community is strongest when it acts together in defence of our shared values.
- We have seen Russian narratives trying to justify the invasion of Ukraine, undermine the Ukrainian government and delegitimize Western responses.
- Russia continues to spread false claims about the capability and intent of the Ukrainian government to develop and deploy chemical, bacteriological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and they seek to distort and distract from atrocities committed by the Russian army.
- Disinformation used as part of the Russian invasion is both overt and covert, coming from state officials and state media, and also via proxies, fake social media accounts, web sites posing as legitimate alternative news outlets and other sources.
- At the same time, the Russian government is imposing unprecedented restrictions within Russia on independent media, blocking social media platforms (deeming these organizations “terrorists”) and criminalizing opposition to the war in Ukraine, in an effort to control its domestic information space and mislead Russian audiences about the war.
- It is important to remember that we are not immune from the threat of hostile activities, even here in Canada. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine will have deep and long-term geopolitical consequences, and directly threatens the rules-based international order.
- Canada will continue to condemn Russia’s invasion and stand up to the global threats posed by foreign interference through strong partnership with like-minded countries and our allies around the world.
- We will continue to use the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism for joint assessment and collective action, including bolstering our engagement with tech platforms and civil society to tackle Russia’s unprecedented information war.
- Canada’s security and intelligence community also remains vigilant against the potential threat of Russian foreign interference against Canadians and Canadian interests in retaliation for our support for Ukraine.
If Pressed on Threats to the Ukraine Diaspora in Canada
- We continue to condemn Russia’s illegal invasion and Canadians stand with the people of Ukraine as they fight for their lives, for their sovereignty, and for global democracy.
- There are over 1.4 million Ukrainians living in Canada and they have been an integral part of Canada’s multicultural fabric dating back to the late 1800s.
- Dealing with foreign interference is not new for the Ukrainian Canadian community. Unfortunately, we’ve seen concerning instances of harassment and intimidation against them, or their relatives abroad, for which there is no place in our society.
- When individuals in Canada are subjected to intimidation or manipulation by foreign states or their proxies, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of individuals in Canada, and will never be tolerated.
- That said, the Ukrainian Canadian community is resilient, and have taken measures to protect themselves against these forms of foreign interference by remaining vigilant and informed.
- We continue to be on the lookout for potential Russian threat activity within Canada, which may include espionage, cyber attacks, and foreign interference – notably against the Ukrainian-Canadian community and against Canadian elected officials of Ukrainian descent.
- Under its Federal Policing mandate, the RCMP targets and investigates illegal foreign interference, including activities related to state-backed harassment and intimidation of diaspora communities in Canada, with a view to laying criminal charges.
- The RCMP also works with its security and intelligence partners to conduct engagement and outreach with targeted communities to build up resilience against, and raise awareness of, foreign interference.
Financial Implications:
- NIL
Background
Foreign interference is understood as hostile activities undertaken by foreign states, or its proxies, that is purposely covert, malign, clandestine and deceptive. It can include threats, harassment and intimidation. Foreign states leverage these activities to advance their strategic interests including: seeking geopolitical influence, economic advancement, revision of the rules-based international order, domestic stability, and military advantage. These activities can be directed at Canadians, or residents of Canada, or against Canadian institutions to advance their strategic interests at the expense of our national interests and values.
Through its mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, CSIS has seen multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canadian institutions and communities. As well, the RCMP is aware that illegal state-backed activities are committed against Canadians and Canadian interests, and investigates these activities further to its mandate. The scope of potential foreign interference activities can be broad, encompassing a range of techniques that are familiar to intelligence agencies. These include human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign influenced media and disinformation campaigns, and the use of sophisticated cyber tools.
Several reports have highlighted the threat of foreign interference in Canada. For example, in its 2020 Public Report, released in April 2021, CSIS stated that espionage and foreign interference activity observed over the past year had reached levels not seen since the Cold War. The report also notes that in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, espionage and foreign interference threats continue to persist and, in some areas, are increasing. Espionage and foreign-influenced activities are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside of Canada, and directly threaten Canada’s national security and strategic interests.
Furthermore, the 2019 Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) outlined foreign interference activities, including the targeting of Canadian institutions by threat actors. The NSICOP (2019) report pointed to Russia and China as being particularly active in Canada and made a number of recommendations for Canada to bolster its response to the threat of foreign interference. The 2020 NSICOP annual report highlighted the significance of this issue to Canada, citing that Russia continues to exploit Russian diaspora and compatriot organizations in Canada. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) also notes that Russia is primarily responsible for this espionage, using clandestine cyber operations to steal proprietary data.
Canada monitors the international information ecosystem for indicators of foreign state sponsored disinformation and is aware of Russia’s long-running disinformation campaigns. Russia’s use of disinformation created a pretext for its illegal invasion of Ukraine and its continued manipulation of information to blur the facts and try to build support for its illegal invasion. Canada is working with a range of partners across industry, civil society, and academia, to support ongoing efforts to identify and counter Russian disinformation around the crisis and build societal resilience to disinformation in Ukraine and globally. The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM), established in 2018 and led by Canada on an ongoing basis, is a forum for addressing foreign threats to democracy, including state-sponsored disinformation. We are also collaborating with international partners through a host of other forums, including NATO, the Media Freedom Coalition, and the Freedom Online Coalition. Through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs), Canada supported over $4.2M in programming between 2019 - 2021, and the Prime Minister recently announced $3M of programming funding for PSOPs to counter Russian disinformation against Ukraine. We are also taking steps to remove Russian propaganda and false narratives from Canadian airwaves. The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) disallowed the distribution of RT (formerly known as Russia Today) by Canadian television service providers as its programming is not in the public interest and is not consistent with Canada’s broadcasting standards.
Threats to Democracy
Canada has observed state-sponsored information manipulation employed by certain regimes, including Russia, aimed at reshaping or undermining the rules-based-international order. Disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices including information on the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Government of Canada’s security and intelligence community is combatting these threats within their respective mandates. CSIS is working closely with other government partners, inside and outside the security and intelligence community, to address clandestine, deceptive or threatening interference activities that can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes. For example, CSIS has longstanding investigations into foreign interference threat activities targeting democratic processes and institutions across Canada. The provision of CSIS intelligence and assessments to senior levels of government allows for informed decision-making when responding to and developing policies to address these threats. Likewise, the RCMP has a broad, multifaceted mandate that allows it to investigate, disrupt, and prevent foreign interference drawing upon authorities enshrined in various legislation.
Information manipulation, in particular disinformation, has been a subject of international collaboration. Canada has discussed the threat and possible responses across a variety of bilateral and multilateral engagements and fora. For example, you represent Canada at the Five-Country Ministerial (FCM), an annual forum where Five Eyes security ministers meet to discuss opportunities for collaboration and information sharing on various national security issues, including foreign interference. These discussions include the sharing of respective approaches to shared issues, and the coordination of a cohesive Five Eyes response. During the 2021 FCM, ministers committed to working together, along with like-minded countries through multilateral fora, to share experiences and report on progress to build collective resilience in the academic, research and development sectors against foreign interference and the unwanted transfer of knowledge.
Threats to Communities
Russia and other foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies. These states may also use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as trusted agents to assist them in foreign interference activity on Canadian soil.
While certain states may attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals in order to pursue anti-corruption measures or enforce other laws in their domestic legal frameworks, these tactics can also be used as a cover for silencing dissent, pressuring political opponents and instilling a general fear of state power no matter where the individual is located.
When foreign states target members of Canadian communities, these individuals, for various reasons, may not have the means to protect themselves or know that they can report these activities to Canadian authorities. The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can force individuals to submit to foreign interference.
These activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians. When CSIS is informed of any allegations of foreign interference, it uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise and respond to the threat, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation. Furthermore, criminal activity with a suspected nexus to a foreign state is investigated by the RCMP.
Threats to the Ukraine Diaspora in Canada
Canada is a reliable and long-standing partner of Ukraine. In 1991, Canada became the first Western country to recognize Ukraine’s independence and the relationship between the two countries has been strengthened by deep people-to-people ties, rooted in the Ukrainian-Canadian community, and by our shared belief in democracy and the importance of the rules-based international order. The Ukrainian diaspora community in Canada has been taking steps to increase resiliency; protect themselves from the impact of Russia’s interference; and support those under attack in Ukraine. Since Russia’s invasion, the Ukrainian community has mobilized through nationwide protests, food and supply drives, drafting letters to MPs and MPPs demanding further Russian sanctions, and raised millions through grass roots and government-led initiatives. On Sunday, February 27, an estimated 30,000 people protested the Russian invasion in Toronto, with similar shows of support across the country. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress, who represent the Ukrainian Canadian community before the people and government of Canada, have run virtual webinars on how to spot Russian disinformation in the past, and have been reminding followers on Facebook that this is an “information war” too and that people should be critical of information before sharing it.
The RCMP is mandated by legislation (Section 2 of the Security Offences Act (SOA) and Ministerial Direction) and RCMP Policy (Operational Manual Section 12) to investigate threats to the security of Canada defined in Section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act; breaches of security defined in the SOA; and any other criminal offence, federal statute, or Criminal Code offence that may have a national security dimension. The RCMP also works with its security and intelligence partners to conduct engagement and outreach with targeted sectors and communities to build up resilience against, and raise awareness of, foreign interference.
National Security criminal investigations of suspected foreign interference are conducted by Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) and National Security Enforcement Sections (NSESs), strategically located in Divisions across Canada. The RCMP’s Federal Policing (FP) Program provides oversight, guidance, and support to foreign interference-related criminal investigations. The RCMP also engages with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police to help inform Police of Jurisdiction (POJs) of the foreign interference threat and to establish mechanisms for reporting foreign interference. Officials from FP participate in several interdepartmental efforts to combat FAI and the RCMP works with international partners – including the Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group – to detect, investigate, prevent, and raise awareness of foreign interference in Canada.
Contacts:
Prepared by: NCSB/NSOD
Approved by: Dominic Rochon, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, 613-990-4976
- Date modified: