Parliamentary Committee Notes: NSIA Opening Remarks (PCO)

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs
Foreign Election Interference

Wednesday 1 March 2023

Thank you, Madame Chair, members of the Committee, for the opportunity to appear today.
Mes collègues et moi appuyons les efforts du Comité pour étudier la question de l’ingérence étrangère au Canada.
It is very important to reassure Canadians that the last two federal elections were fair and legitimate. Canadians have questions about foreign interference attempts during the last elections and we will endeavor to answer them in the most transparent way possible, within the limits of the law. We, as national security officials, have a duty to protect classified information - unauthorized sharing of classified information is in fact prohibited by the Security of Information Act.
That is not to say that we cannot or should not talk about Foreign interference, which is not a new phenomenon, nor is it unique to Canada.
But, we believe this threat is on the rise and increasingly complex.
The greatest foreign interference threat to Canada comes from the People’s Republic of China, though other states, like Russia and Iran, are also attempting to covertly or coercively interfere in our affairs.
As highlighted in many public reports – including from CSIS and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians – foreign interference takes many forms, such as:

undue pressure on politicians, staff, and public servants to obtain information or sway decisions;
intimidation of diasporas and other communities – including for example, by denying visas to visit family;
mis- or dis-information to weaken Canada’s societal cohesion – we have seen this play out in the context of Canada’s support to Ukraine;
encroachments into our territory or networks for intelligence collection; and
theft of our science, data, and research.

Measuring the short and long term impacts of foreign interference is a challenge. But we know that it:

costs Canada tens of billions of dollars annually in lost profitability;
erodes Canadian technological advantages, particularly in emerging technologies;
undermines national unity and sows discontent;
threatens the safety of targeted individuals and their entourage; and
challenges democracy.

Over the past few years, we have taken a number of steps to more effectively detect, deter and counter foreign interference in all its forms, including during election periods.
One effective way to do so is to talk about the threat and how we mitigate it without jeopardizing the sources and techniques used to gather intelligence and keep Canadians safe. As I said, one of our responsibilities as senior officials of the security and intelligence community is to be as transparent as possible without further challenging national security or further damaging trust in our democratic institutions.
As such, we have been engaging with communities, academia, industry, and politicians to raise awareness and provide tools to help address this broad, complex threat.
Tools like the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which contributed to ensure that the 2019 and 2021 federal elections were indeed fair and that their legitimacy was assured despite foreign interference attempts.
These effective mechanisms form part of a broader counter foreign interference toolkit, which also includes:

Countering mis- and dis-information, including using active cyber tools, and leading the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism;
Enhancing research security, including with guidance to research granting councils;
Protecting our networks from malicious actors, including through the creation of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security; and
Investigating, disrupting and/or prosecuting foreign interference activity.

But we cannot be complacent. Our adversaries adapt quickly and find innovative ways to interfere in our affairs. And so we must continue to learn—including from one election to the next—to refine our collective defences.
Part of this is better informing Canadians of the threats we all face. But I will stress again that this must be done responsibly, without putting at risk the physical safety of our human sources and employees by publicly divulging classified material. Given the very nature of intelligence, individual reports when taken out of context may be incomplete and misrepresentative of the full story.
We must also carefully consider that – as recently suggested that Mr. Shugart – in some instances, publicly disclosing intelligence on foreign states’ specific attempts to interfere may ultimately play into their hands, including by potentially affecting the outcomes of electoral processes and creating confusion.
To conclude, while I was not in my current role in 2019 or 2021, I speak for the Security and Intelligence community when I say that we are clear-eyed in understanding the challenge posed by foreign interference. We are taking concrete steps to strengthen our counter foreign interference approach, including by making sure that those who engage in such activities face consequences.
Une fois de plus, je vous remercie, et c’est avec plaisir que me collègues et moi répondrons à vos questions.
Merci Madame la Présidente.