Parliamentary Committee Notes: List of Witnesses and Summaries

Study on the matter of Foreign Election Interference

February 9, 2023 (Meeting 51)

Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Lisa Ducharme, Acting Director General, Federal Policing National Intelligence  

Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Adam Fisher, Director General, Intelligence Assessments  
Cherie Henderson, Assistant Director, Requirements  

Communications Security Establishment
Lyall King, Director, Risk Mitigation Programs  

February 7, 2023 (Meeting 50)

As an individual
Charles Burton, Senior Fellow, Centre for Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad, Macdonald-Laurier Institute  
David Mulroney, Former Ambassador of Canada to the People's Republic of China  

MediaSmarts
Matthew Johnson, Director of Education  

December 13, 2022 (Meeting 47)

Hon. Dominic LeBlanc, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities  
Hon. Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs  

Privy Council Office
Allen Sutherland, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions  

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Tara Denham, Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion  
Weldon Epp, Director General, North East Asia  

November 22, 2022 (Meeting 41)

Elections Canada
Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer  

November 3, 2022 (Meeting 38)

As an individual
Jim Judd, Former Director of Canadian Security Intelligence Service  

DisinfoWatch
Marcus Kolga, Director  

Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force
Adam Fisher, Director General, Intelligence Assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service  
Lisa Ducharme, Acting Director General, Federal Policing National Intelligence, Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
Lyall King, Director, Risk Mitigation Programs, Communications Security Establishment  
Tara Denham, Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development  

November 1, 2022 (Meeting 37)

Elections Canada
Serge Caron, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer and Chief of Security, Digital Transformation Sector  
Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer  

Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Michelle Tessier, Deputy Director, Operations  

Communications Security Establishment
Alia Tayyeb, Deputy Chief of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 

Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections
Caroline Simard, Commisioner of Canada Elections, Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections  
Marc Chénier, Deputy Commissioner and Chief Legal Counsel

Summaries of meetings on Foreign Election Interference

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC)

Thursday, February 9, 2023
11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

Report Prepared By

Stephan Dietz, Senior Analyst, Parliamentary Affairs

Topic of Meeting

Foreign Election Interference

Members in Attendance

Appearing

11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Communications Security Establishment

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Summary

Mr. Cooper (CPC) began the meeting by seeking clarification on whether the first hour (public) and second hour (in camera) would only touch on unclassified information. Mr. King confirmed that would be the case and Mr. Cooper moved that the second hour be conducted in public. The motion carried.  

Witness testimony touched a variety of topics that have previously been the focus of meetings, including election investigations, foreign election interference, foreign language capabilities in the intelligence services, foreign agent registry, and recommendations on areas for improvement.
At the end of the meeting, Mr. Cooper (CPC) moved a motion related to a February 8, 2023 Global News article by Sam Cooper alleging a report to the Prime Minister in June 2017 on Chinese election interference. The motion sought to:

  1. add additional meetings to committee’s study on foreign election interference;
  2. invite to appear before the committee: Katie Telford, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister; Michael Wernick, Former Clerk of the Privy Council, and Daniel Jean, Former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister; and
  3. order the production of documents of memoranda, briefing notes, records of conversations, emails, and other relevant documents related to report detailed in Global News article, and that the documents be produced within two weeks of the adoption of the motion.

The Liberals moved an amendment to the motion that would see the committee:

  1. add additional meetings to committee’s study on foreign election interference;
  2. invite to appear before the committee: Michael Wernick, Former Clerk of the Privy Council, and Daniel Jean, Former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister.

The amendment to the motion was then carried with the Liberals and the NDP voting for, and the Bloc and the Conservatives voted against.

The motion as amended was then carried unanimously.

Election Interference

Mr. Calkins (CPC) questioned officials on what the bar should be for public notification of electoral interference – should it be if a single riding election has been impacted by electoral interference? Mr. Fisher replied that outside of electoral periods, efforts are being made to communicate where possible in an unclassified setting. He added that CSIS does not measure whether the interference changed the course of an election, but rather that an investigation is conducted as soon as evidence of interference is identified.

Ms. Blaney (NDP) asked the witnesses what foreign election interference looks like online and what measures are being taken to educate Canadians. Mr. King replied that there is often spillover from the US media and political ecosystem. He pointed to Russia sharing disinformation on COVID-19 as an example of something that did not necessarily target Canada, but was felt here.

Mr. Berthold (CPC) questioned if it was true that officials were being targeted by China. Ms. Henderson replied that it was true that all levels of government are susceptible for foreign actors – municipal, provincial, federal. She added that China was doing this but that other nations states were as well. Mr. Fisher confirmed that it was true that community leaders and organizations were used by China to conduct these operations.

In response to a question from Ms. Blaney (NDP) on notifying MPs when they are being influenced, Ms. Henderson stressed the importance of educating MPs so that they can recognize if they were being approached. She added that CSIS has unclassified documents on this, and that if there is a real threat to an MP, that they will intervene and have a discussion with the MP or candidate.

Election Investigations

In response to a question from Mr. Cooper (CPC), Ms. Ducharme confirmed that there are active investigations into foreign interference activities.

Mr. Cooper questioned Mr. King about why former CPC MP Kenny Chiu was kept in the dark about the investigation of election interference. Mr. King stated that it wasn’t a decision of the SITE task force and that it was a decision made by the panel on Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPC).

Recommendations

Ms. Sahota (LPC) and Ms. Blaney (NDP) questioned officials on what recommendations they had for the committee, particularly any gaps in policy or legislation. Ms. Henderson replied that the CSIS Act was created in 1984 and the many of the issues CSIS deals with our technological that were not foreseen when the Act was created. She added that CSIS is unable to share classified information with provincial or municipal partners and that they should be able to do this, and that the ability for the Service to use and crunch big data was a noted shortcoming. She added that it is time for a review of the CSIS Act and that other nations do this on a regular basis.

Both CSIS and the RCMP cited the process of turning intelligence into evidence as an area where additional resources and attention should be paid.

Foreign Agent Registry

Ms. Gaudreau (BQ) questioned whether having a foreign agent registry would be necessary to for  intervene with greater vigilance. Ms. Ducharme replied that the RCMP would find that valuable. Ms. Henderson added that CSIS sees the benefit of a registry and have provided that advice to government, but that it was necessary to take the time to get it right.

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

February 7, 2023
12:00 a.m. to 1:05 p.m.

Report Prepared By

Charles MacLean, PCO – Legislation and House Planning

Topic of Meeting

Foreign Election Interference

Members in Attendance

Witnesses

Summary

The committee resumed its study of foreign election interference and heard from stakeholders.

David Mulroney, former  Canadian ambassador to China, stated that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the main foreign interference threat to Canada and outlined the PRC’s goals and it tools.  He made four recommendations:  

Charles Burton, senior fellow of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, agreed with Mr. Mulroney’s testimony and focused on allegations that PRC diplomats were complicit in foreign election interference in 2019 and 2021. He argued that the PRC’s approach to foreign affairs involves deception, co-optation and corruption through its United Front initiative. He stated that the PRC ambassador oversees this approach in Canada. Mr. Burton outlined these efforts in correspondence to the committee in the fall. He suggested that the exceptionally large number of PRC diplomats in Canada may be engaged in United Front activities, and that CSIS should be in a position to confirm this.

Matthew Johnson of MediaSmarts advocated for medial literacy education in schools to build resiliency to misinformation.  He recommended the Finnish model where digital literacy is integrated into all courses.  He recommended adopting a national media literacy strategy with partners and PTs, and funding its implementation.

Questions

2021 Election

In response to questions from Mr. Cooper (CPC) and Mr. Berthold (CPC), Mr. Burton stated that he believes that PRC foreign interference influenced the outcome in the riding of CPC candidate Kenny Chu. Mr. Burton stated that the federal government does not have the capacity to respond to mandarin language interference.  

In a follow-up question, Ms O’Connell (LPC) stated that Mr. Chu and the CPC could have raised their concerns with the government agencies that were monitoring and responding to foreign interference. Mr. Burton stated that the alleged interference activities intensified after polls reported the possibility of a CPC minority government, and that the number of activities made it difficult to respond.

When asked by Mr. Cooper (CPC) whether the Government has been transparent about the extent of foreign election interference, Mr. Barton stated that Canada is much less forthcoming than Five Eyes partners.  He recommended that more information be shared, e.g. through briefings to parliamentarians. Mr. Mulroney said that interference that impacts a single riding disenfranchises voters.  He stated that the bar for briefing out on foreign interference needs to be revised.

Diaspora Communities

Mr. Berthold (CPC) asked whether donations to the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation were an example of the PRC attempting to influence the Government. Mr. Burton speculated about the potential use of members of the Chinese diaspora community as proxies. However, he clearly stated that there was no evidence to support this and that allegations should not be made in the absence of evidence.

In a follow-up question, Ms Sahota (LPC) raised concern that singling out specific diaspora communities without evidence was inappropriate in a multicultural country.  Mr. Barton stated that members of all diaspora communities should participate in the democratic processes, provided that they support liberal democracy and do not have divided loyalties.

Ms Blaney (NDP) stated that law enforcement does not know how to respond to complaints of foreign interference from the Uyghur community in Canada.  Mr. Mulroney acknowledged that the response needs to be improved.

Foreign Agents Registry

Ms O’Connell (LPC) asked Mr. Mulroney whether he advised the previous government to establish a foreign agents registry.  Mr. Mulroney stated that he was only aware of the foreign interference threat from the PRC after he returned to Canada. He stated that previous governments were appropriately security-conscious. 

Ms Gaudreau (BQ) asked witnesses whether the Government may be downplaying a foreign agents registry because it does not want to contribute to anti-Asian racism.  Ms Gaudreau referred to statements made by Minister Mendicino before the Canada-China Special Committee on February 6, 2023.  Mr. Mulroney noted that the PRC targets diaspora communities. He recommended that the Government first announce that it is creating a foreign agents registry to send a message to the PRC, and then consult diaspora communities on implementation.

In a follow-up question, Ms Blaney (NDP) asked whom the Government should consult in establishing a foreign agents registry.  Mr. Barton stated that the Canadian Coalition on Human Rights in China has requested that there be a government organization to report foreign interference.  He stated that the obligation to register would fall on individuals receiving a benefit from a foreign state and not on diaspora communities.

Media Literacy

Ms Blaney (NDP) asked how to reach rural and Indigenous communities in media literacy efforts. Mr. Johnson stated that equitable access is the key element to building media literacy.  Media literacy strategies must be whole-of-society and focus on the needs of adults as well as students.

Ms O’Connell (LPC) asked whether legislation should be introduced to require platforms to advise users about hidden hashtags.  Mr. Johnson declined to comment on the legislation, but stated that users should be made aware of them.

When asked by Ms O’Connell (LPC) whether media literacy education could address the use of small media outlets as proxies, Mr. Johnson stated that media literacy education could address misinformation from large and small media organizations.

Five Eye Partners

Mr. Cooper (CPC) asked Mr. Mulroney to provide his assessment of Canada’s response to PRC foreign interference. Mr. Mulroney stated that the US, UK and Australia have each had issues with PRC foreign interference and that these countries are acting to counter the PRC.  By comparison, Mr. Mulroney stated that the PRC is targeting Canada because it is comparatively easier. He stated that PRC interference in Canada is growing.

Foreign Interference before 2019

In response to a question from Mr. Turnbull (LPC), Mr. Burton stated that there has been an increase in PRC foreign interference in recent years and that  General Secretary Xi Jinping has allocated additional resources to the United Front. He anticipates that the PRC will increase its foreign interference activities in the future, if Canada does not take enforcement action.

Foreign Funding

In response to a question from Ms Gaudreau (BQ) about how to improve Canada’s response to foreign election interference, Mr. Mulroney suggested that additional systems should be implemented, e.g., tracking foreign funding as it passes through different organizations.

NB – Mr. Cooper (CPC) quoted Ms O’Connell (LPC) when asking a question about the Government’s response to foreign election interference.  When asking her first question, Ms O’Connell asked Mr. Cooper to table the full quotation, so as not to mislead the committee.  Mr. Cooper did not respond.

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

Dec 13, 2022
11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

Report Prepared By

Charles MacLean, PCO – Legislation and House Planning

Topic of Meeting

Members in Attendance

Witnesses

Summary

In the first hour, the committee met in camera to consider the draft report on hybrid proceedings.

During the second hour, the committee resumed its study of foreign election interference with the appearance of Minister LeBlanc and Minister Joly.

In his opening remarks, Minister LeBlanc stated that Canadian elections are free and fair and acknowledged the role of non-partisan public servants in protecting democratic institutions.  The Minister acknowledged that Canada has been a target for foreign election interference and outlined the strategy that the Government put into place in 2019 to combat foreign interference in democratic institutions.   

Minister Joly outlined the threat posed by Russian disinformation which aims to disrupt western democracies. The Minister noted that Canada has not been a specific target of Russian disinformation, but stated that Canada has implemented specific measures to combat this threat all the same. 

Minister Joly stated that China has become more sophisticated in implementing online campaigns to quickly influence Canadians and other peoples worldwide. China can micro-target its messaging to specific communities. Minister Joly has raised this threat with her Chinese counterparts. Minister Joly outlined the approach to China in the recent Indo-Pacific Strategy, which includes protecting Canadian infrastructure and democracy (including elections) from foreign interference.  

Questioning

CPC members focussed exclusively on the whether the Ministers were aware of foreign interference, either the allegations in the Global article or any other incidents.  CPC members cited a Foreign Intelligence Briefing from February 2020 that referenced an active foreign interference network.  

LPC members focused on the strategy put in place in 2019 to combat foreign election interference, the engagement of registered parties in the House as part of the strategy, and how the strategy compared to the approach in elections before 2019.

Both the BQ and NDP sought to obtain additional public information on the Govt’s strategy in order to build public trust in elections.  The BQ asked about thresholds for the CEIPP to alert the public about incidents. The NDP member argued that the 11 candidates referred to in the Global article should be named.

Highlights

Interference in the 2019 Election

Targeted Candidates

Production of Papers

Indo-Pacific Strategy

Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP)

Engagement with Registered Parties in the House

Foreign Interference in Previous Elections

Accountability to Parliament

Prosecuting Foreign Election Interference

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

Nov 22, 2022
11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

Report Prepared By

Charles MacLean, PCO – Legislation and House Planning

Topic of Meeting

Expanding the Federal Jurisdiction for the Operational Security of the Parliamentary Precinct to Include Sections of Wellington St and Sparks St
Foreign Election Interference

Members in Attendance

Witnesses

Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada

Summary

In the first hour, the committee met in camera to consider the draft report on expanding federal jurisdiction for operational security to sections of Wellington and Sparks Streets.

During the second hour, the committee resumed its study of foreign election interference with a focus on allegations in a recent news article about the 2019 election campaign.

The Chief Electoral Office (CEO) appeared. In brief opening remarks, the CEO explained that there is a process in place to respond to alleged non-compliance with the foreign funding prohibitions of the Canada Elections Act.  Allegations should be referred to the Commissioner of Canada Elections for investigation.  In answering questions, the CEO stressed that he has no role in determining whether there is non-compliance.

During the meeting, the CEO frequently cautioned committee members against drawing inferences from the article. He stated that an investigation and court process would be necessary to confirm whether there was foreign election interference.  In addition, the CEO said that the statements in the article, if true, did not necessarily mean there was foreign election inference.  He suggested that the article could instead indicate there was corruption.

Questioning

CPC members focused on whether the allegations were reported for investigation and whether an investigation was launched. CPC members also engaged the CEO about thresholds for identifying and acting on foreign interference.  CPC expressed interest in inviting the Commissioner to answer these questions.

LPC members focused on findings that the 2019 and 2020 elections were free and fair, and on how to instill confidence in the electoral system.

The BQ member primarily asked broad, open-ended questions about improving the current process.

The NDP member focused on how to instill confidence in the electoral system, and on recommendations made by the CEO about modifying the foreign funding prohibitions in the Canada Elections Act.

Highlights

Investigation

Preparations

Current Risk Assessment

Assessment of Recent Elections

Public Confidence

Election Financing Prohibitions

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

Nov 3, 2022
11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

Report Prepared By

Charles MacLean, PCO – Legislation and House Planning

Topic of Meeting

Foreign Election Interference

Members in Attendance

Witnesses

First Hour

Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force

Summary

The committee resumed its study of the foreign election interference.  Representatives of the departments on the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE) appeared in the first hour.  In the second hour, the committee heard from

First Hour

In his opening remarks, Lyall King, CSE,  gave an overview of the mandate, roles and responsibilities of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force.

Second Hour

In the second hour, Mr. Kolga of the NGO DisinfoWatch, outlined his organizations’ analysis that Chinese state actors engaged in a disinformation campaign to interfere in the riding of former CPC MP Kenny Chu in the 2021 election.  Mr. Kolga stated that the Kremlin engages in continuous foreign interference.  This includes efforts to amplify vaccine hesitancy and anti-lockdown narratives, which were key issues during the 2021 election.  Russia has also focused on marginalizing and dehumanizing parliamentarians of Ukrainian descent, including Minister Freeland.

Jim Judd stated that he undertook a review the critical election incident protocol and the panel of senior officials during the 2019 election, as mandated by the protocol.  He noted that he did not have access to classified information during his review as his review focused on processes.

Questioning

2021 General Election

Critical Election Incident Protocol

Foreign State Actors

Cybersecurity

Social Media Platforms

Resources and Tools

Enforcement

Marginalized Groups as Targets

Classified Briefings to Parliamentarians

Public Awareness

Pre-Election Period

Follow-Up / Suivi

Next Steps / Prochaines étapes

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

Nov 1, 2022
11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

Report Prepared By

Charles MacLean, PCO – Legislation and House Planning

Topic of Meeting

Foreign Election Interference

Members in Attendance

Witnesses

First Hour

Summary

The committee began its study on foreign election interference. The Chief Electoral Officer and the Commissioner of Canada Elections appeared in the first hour. CSIS  and CSE appeared in the second hour.

First Hour

The Chief Electoral Officer stated that Elections Canada has not experienced any IT breaches or interference with its operations.  Elections Canada is not aware of any efforts by foreign actors to undermine the ability of Canadians to vote. Elections Canada identifies inaccurate information about the electoral process from either domestic or foreign sources, and puts out the correct information. Elections Canada works with partners to counter foreign interference. Elections Canada has worked with CSE to improve its IT systems and with CSIS and the CSE on foreign threats.

The Commissioner outlined her mandate as it relates to responding to complaints about foreign interference during the electoral period. She did not observe a significant change in the number of complaints about foreign interference during the last two elections.  She noted that it can be complex to investigate foreign entities.  Her office works with key national security and law enforcement agencies to identify potential foreign interference threats.

Second Hour

Michelle Tessier, Deputy Director, Operations, CSIS, provided an overview of foreign interference in elections and democratic institutions.  Ms Tessier explained CSIS’ role in working with partners to combat foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections.

Alia Tayyeb, Deputy Chief of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) at CSE, outlined that Canada and Canadians are targeted by foreign interference. She stated that most online foreign interference comes from Russia, China and Iran.  The CSE has provided cybersecurity advice and guidance to Elections Canada on its IT systems.

Questioning

Misinformation

Right Wing Ideologically Motivated Extremism

Foreign State Actors

Foreign Funding

Political Donations

Mail-in Ballots

Covert Interference

Enforcement

Enumeration

Pre-election Period

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