Parliamentary Committee Notes: Questions and Answers Part 1: Telecommunications Act Amendments

Bill C-26, An Act Respecting Cyber Security

Table of Contents

• Q1. Is this a ban on Huawei?
• Q2. Why is the threat higher in 5G than in 4G?
• Q3. If a TSP announces a partnership with Huawei for 5G, can we remove their products later?
• Q4. How could a future decision on whether to restrict high risk suppliers from 5G networks affect Canada's rural communities' ability to access the Internet?
• Q5. Will China be able to influence Canada if high risk suppliers are present in the Canadian wireless telecommunications system?
• Q6. Should work begin immediately on an order to restrict Huawei and ZTE?
• Q7. Are Huawei phones being considered?
• Q8. Will this framework address all security concerns in the telecommunications system?
• Q9. Does this fall short of what the United States asked Canada to do?
• Q10. What are some of the findings of the government's 5G security examination?
• Q11. Will the Government share the results of its security review? (Why won't the Government be transparent on this?)
• Q12. What evidence did the Government find on Huawei during its review?
• Q13. When did the security review wrap up? Why did it take the Government so long to come out with this policy?
• Q14. Why have secret orders? Does this not undermine the message that cyber security is a shared responsibility?
• Q15. Is this not just a way for the government to move ahead with Lawful Access?
• Q16. This confers extraordinary powers, such as 'terminating services to anyone'. How can the government ensure they aren't cutting off essential services for Canadians?
• Q17. How is there going to be any accountability when the government can order anything, and the public might never know?
• Q18. By banning compensation, won't this hurt small providers?
• Q19. The information collection provisions seem enormously broad, and even allows for sharing with foreign governments. How can Canadians believe their privacy is being protected?

Updated as of October 30, 2023

Q1. Is this a ban on Huawei?

• Amendments to the Telecommunications Act will provide the Government of Canada with a clear and explicit legal authority to prohibit Canadian telecommunications service providers from using high risk products and services. Once the amendments receive Royal Assent, the Government will be in a position to apply these new order making powers.
• The Government's statement on telecommunications security makes it clear that Canada considers Huawei and ZTE high risk suppliers. The statement announced the intention to prohibit the use of designated products and services from these suppliers, subject to consultations. The amendments to the Telecommunications Act will provide the Government with a legislative tool to effect such a ban.

Q2. Why is the threat higher in 5G than in 4G?

• Any telecommunications products or services, regardless of vendor origin, have the potential to contain security risks that can be exploited. We expect 5G networks to be more decentralized, meaning that sensitive data may not be as easily segregated as it is now. As these networks are deployed, we also expect that there will be exponentially more devices connecting to the networks, and subsequently more data travelling through these networks. This growth in access and traffic will result in greater disruption or espionage access points than in the existing structure; because of the interconnectedness of these devices, potentially more serious and cascading consequences may result if a vulnerability is exploited.

Q3. If a TSP announces a partnership with Huawei for 5G, can we remove their products later?

• By enacting the legislative amendments to the Telecommunications Act, the Government will have a clear and explicit legal mechanism to compel telecommunications service providers to take action, which includes restricting or prohibiting the use of certain products or services, if required.

Q4. How could a future decision on whether to restrict high risk suppliers from 5G networks affect Canada's rural communities' ability to access the Internet?

• The proposed 4G and 5G restrictions would not be expected to have negative impacts on Internet access in rural markets, which are often serviced by smaller TSPs. To maintain the resiliency of networks, the initial design of these restrictions and timelines took into consideration the existing challenges faced by smaller TSPs and their limited capabilities relative to larger providers.
• More time would be given for the removal of 4G equipment because the risks are more manageable compared to those in 5G. These extended 4G timelines would allow TSPs, particularly smaller operators serving rural and remote markets, to take action in accordance with typical industry equipment lifespans and capital upgrade cycles.

Q5. Will China be able to influence Canada if high risk suppliers are present in the Canadian wireless telecommunications system?

• The Government of Canada has serious concerns about suppliers such as Huawei and ZTE, who could be compelled to comply with extrajudicial directions from foreign governments in ways that would conflict with Canadian laws or would be detrimental to Canadian interests.

Q6. Should work begin immediately on an order to restrict Huawei and ZTE?

• The government will decide on the issuance of an order once the amendments to the Telecommunications Act receive Royal Assent. This decision would be subject to consultation.

Q7. Are Huawei phones being considered?

• Handheld devices have so far not been deemed as high risk to Canada's telecommunications system.

Q8. Will this framework address all security concerns in the telecommunications system?

• Threats to Canada's telecommunications system will continue, even with this security framework. Malicious actors, both state and non-state, will use any means available to them to achieve their goals. Our proposed framework will give us the tools we need to mitigate these risks, but work must continue to assess and analyze the threat, along with appropriate Government responses.

Q9. Does this fall short of what the United States asked Canada to do?

• We have been clear since the beginning that Canada would make its own decision about how best to secure the Canadian telecommunications system – a decision that is best for Canada and Canadians. The Government of Canada listened very carefully to the advice of our allies. The measures announced could enable us to address the security concerns that we and our allies have noted. It is also important to remember that, since 2013, through the Security Review Program, Canada has been taking action to keep our telecommunications system secure.

Q10. What are some of the findings of the government's 5G security examination?

• In terms of telecommunications security, the examination found risks will be more difficult to contain in 5G networks because of their higher degree of interconnectedness of sensitive network functions. As a result, high-risk suppliers' access to 5G networks should be limited to the greatest extent possible.

Q11. Will the Government share the results of its security review? (Why won't the Government be transparent on this?)

• National security review processes are undertaken in consultation with the government's security agencies. The law limits the amount of detail that can be disclosed. These limits are important to protect national security.

Q12. What evidence did the Government find on Huawei during its review?

• In conducting its security review, the government relied on many sources including classified intelligence, media reporting, and consultation with allies. Of particular concern, applicable to any vendor, is a requirement to obey extra judicial direction, as is the case with Huawei and ZTE.

Q13. When did the security review wrap up? Why did it take the Government so long to come out with this policy?

• This is a multi-faceted and complicated matter. After careful consideration, the Government tabled amendments to the Telecommunications Act that will enable it to take action to secure the Canadian telecommunications system. This approach is best for Canada and Canadians.

Q14. Why have secret orders? Does this not undermine the message that cyber security is a shared responsibility?

• The Government intends to make as much information public as is possible, and the legislation grants authority to publish orders in the Canada Gazette. Any use of a confidential order would be done in a limited set of circumstances in order to protect the security of Canada's networks. For instance, there may be circumstances where it is not in the interests of the operators and of Canada's cyber security in general for an order to be made public until the situation (e.g. vulnerability in the networks) has been resolved.
• We are sensitive to the security concerns of Canadian operators, and of their customers. We will not take actions which could put their networks at risk.
• The objective of the proposed Telecommunications Act amendments is to protect Canada's telecommunications system. Doing so will require cooperation and coordination with telecommunication service providers. This may be facilitated by the availability of confidential orders.

Q15. Is this not just a way for the government to move ahead with Lawful Access?

• The Telecommunications Act amendments were developed to secure Canada's telecommunications system. The proposed order-making powers are tied to the new policy objective, and are not intended to be used for law enforcement purposes.
• The Bill is designed to address a range of engineering, design and other issues, such as increasing resilience in the event of extreme weather situations. We have seen this recently with Hurricane Fiona, and with the Rogers outage, which was caused by a network system failure following an update.
• The TA changes do not rely on the metric of 'national security' as is used in some other acts; the objective is security of the telecommunications system.

Q16. This confers extraordinary powers, such as 'terminating services to anyone'. How can the government ensure they aren't cutting off essential services for Canadians?

• This is a significant power, and its use is intended to be very limited. In addition, the Minister of Public Safety must be consulted before the Minister of Industry issues such an order.
• This power can be used only to take actions to secure the networks, including to protect them from disruption, manipulation and interference. For example, there are known network interference threats where an operator loses control of part of their network, putting customer's data at risk. In such cases for example, the Minister could order those network connections to be suspended, if doing so would restore stability more broadly. The primary objective in creating this power is to have the ability to restore the security of the Canadian telecommunications system in extraordinary cases.

Q17. How is there going to be any accountability when the government can order anything, and the public might never know?

• The government can only order actions needed to promote the security of Canada's telecommunication system. The reasonableness of any actions ordered can be subject to review by the courts.

Q18. By banning compensation, won't this hurt small providers?

• It is our intention to consult and consider the circumstances of affected entities, including on costs, before making any order under the Telecommunications Act.
• It is our intention to continue voluntary collaboration with the TSPs on an ongoing basis. The intention is for operators to phase out untrusted equipment, and to avoid pursuing future investment in such equipment.
• Follow up: While the text of Bill C-26 states '”no one is entitled to any compensation,” this does not prevent the GC from providing compensation in certain circumstances.

Q19. The information collection provisions seem enormously broad, and even allows for sharing with foreign governments. How can Canadians believe their privacy is being protected?

• Bill C-26 is clear about the reasons for which the information can be shared – it is about protecting the Canadian telecommunications system. The Bill enables the designation of third party information as confidential and establishes a framework for the protection and treatment of such information.
• In a crisis where telecommunications are being disrupted, we would want to be able to consult experts in government on how best to address the concern. We would also want to help our allies to secure their telecommunication systems, and likewise we might require their help to secure ours.
• The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Privacy Act protect Canadians with respect to their personal information held by the government. This includes any personal information that may be collected under Bill C-26.

Date modified:

2024-06-04