Modernizing Canada's Toolkit to Counter Foreign Interference: An Act respecting countering foreign interference

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• Changes to the Security of Information Act
• Modernization of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act
• Modernization of the sabotage offence in the Criminal Code
• Amendments to the Canada Evidence Act
• Creation of the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry under the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA)

In May 2024, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference. This legislation received Royal Assent in June 2024.

An Act respecting countering foreign interference bolsters Canada's ability to detect, disrupt and counter foreign interference threats to all people in Canada, including members of diaspora communities, through a series of new measures and legislative amendments to national security and criminal laws. This includes changes to the Security of Information Act, the modernization of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, and the modernization of the sabotage offence in the Criminal Code. It also amends the Canada Evidence Act to establish a standardized and streamlined regime for handling sensitive information in administrative proceedings in the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal of Canada.

An Act respecting countering foreign interference also establishes a Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act, which would mandate the establishment of a new Foreign Influence Transparency Registry in Canada.

Changes to the Security of Information Act

The Security of Information Act (SOIA) criminalizes information-related conduct that may be harmful to Canada, such as spying, economic espionage and foreign-influenced threats or violence. The SOIA was last substantially revised in 2001.

Under An Act respecting countering foreign interference, the SOIA has been amended to:

• create new foreign interference offences to better address foreign interference risks to Canada and to ensure that hostile activities are fully addressed by the criminal law, including those involving:
  • deceptive or surreptitious acts that undermine democratic processes (including foreign interference in nomination contests and federal, provincial, territorial, municipal and Indigenous governments or democratic processes); An example of such an act would be surreptitiously influencing the outcomes of political processes, such as the nomination of a candidate;
  • deceptive or surreptitious acts that harm Canadian interests (e.g., knowingly facilitating the entry into Canada of agents of a foreign entity who are posing as tourists); and
  • indictable offences committed when directed by, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
• amend Section 20 of the Act to better address transnational threats or violence by those who work on behalf of foreign entities to intimidate people living in Canada, including members of diaspora communities who may be uniquely vulnerable to these threats, and their families abroad (for example, an individual in Canada working on behalf of a foreign state threatening to harm relatives of a Canadian citizen who live in the foreign state);
• expand the preparatory acts offence (Section 22), which targets doing anything to prepare ahead of committing an offence (such as espionage), to cover more SOIA offences and the new foreign interference offences, and enhancing the existing penalties;
• amend the definition of “special operational information” to address the inappropriate sharing of military technology and knowledge; and
• amend the definitions of person permanently bound to secrecy and allowing Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) units to be added to the SOIA schedule, so that CAF groups can be permanently bound to secrecy.

To better reflect these amendments, the SOIA has been renamed the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act (FISI Act).

Changes to the now FISI Act took effect on August 19, 2024.

Modernization of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference will make targeted amendments to modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act. This will better equip the Government of Canada to build resilience and to counter the modern threats Canada faces today, including foreign interference.

To ensure the safety, security, and prosperity of Canada, CSIS must be able to:

Equip national security partners

• This legislation enables broader disclosure of CSIS information to key partners beyond the Government of Canada, with appropriate safeguards, to help partners build resiliency to threats.
• The Act permits CSIS to make disclosures to partners to build resiliency to threats.

Operate in a digital world

• This legislation will increase CSIS' ability to be more agile and effective in its investigations, by introducing new warrants for specific investigative techniques.
• It will also enhance CSIS' capacity to collect and use datasets.
• The Act closes a gap created by technology, regaining the ability for CSIS to collect, from within Canada, foreign intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of foreign states and foreign individuals in Canada.

Respond to evolving threats

• This legislation will implement a statutory requirement for Parliament to review the CSIS Act every five years to ensure that it keeps pace with advances in technology and data, as well as other evolutions in the national security space.

Changes to the CSIS Act take effect immediately.

Modernization of the sabotage offence in the Criminal Code

There are existing Criminal Code offences that address different types of conduct in connection with foreign interference, such as sabotage, intimidation, uttering threats, computer hacking and bribery, amongst others.

Under An Act respecting countering foreign interference, the Criminal Code has been amended to:

• introduce a new sabotage offence focused on conduct directed at essential infrastructure and specify categories of protected essential infrastructure, including private and public infrastructure systems that enable transportation or communications, or support the delivery of health and food services;
• expressly clarify that the sabotage offences do not apply to legitimate advocacy, protest or dissent in circumstances where there is no intention to cause the serious harms specified in the legislation;
• introduce a new offence of making, possessing, selling and/or distributing a device to commit a sabotage offence. This includes things like “bots”, which are Internet-connected devices that are infected with malware; and,
• modernize and clarify the mental element (the specific state of mind of the accused) required for the offence of sabotage.

Changes to the Criminal Code took effect on August 19, 2024.

Amendments to the Canada Evidence Act

The Canada Evidence Act has been amended to:

• create a Secure Administrative Review Proceeding (SARP), with a standardized process under s. 38 of the CEA relating to the protection and use of sensitive information in federal administrative proceedings such as judicial reviews and statutory appeals in the Federal Court or Federal Court of Appeals (with the exception of all matters under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which will continue under existing IRPA processes); it also allows for the appointment of special counsel in these SARP proceedings;
• amend s. 37 and s. 38 of the CEA to provide that, unless there are exceptional circumstances, any decision not to disclose specified public interest or national security information should only be appealed by the accused following the end of their criminal trial and in the event of a conviction. This seeks to address concerns about trial delay and interruption and would help with court efficiency and resources, by ensuring that interlocutory appeals are not launched by defendants unless there is a criminal conviction; and,
• amend the sealing order provision of the Criminal Code to clarify that national security considerations would be expressly included in the list of reasons for a judge to consider when deciding whether to issue a sealing order in relation to a Criminal Code warrant.

Changes to the Canada Evidence Act took effect on August 19, 2024.

Creation of the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry under the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA)

An Act respecting countering foreign interference will also enact the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA) to establish a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry. The FITAA will impose a registration obligation on individuals and entities when three conditions are met:

• First, there needs to be an arrangement between an individual or entity and a foreign principal, where the individual or entity acts at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal;
• Second, the activities undertaken on behalf of the foreign principal include any of the following: communication with a public office holder; communication or dissemination of information to the public by any means, including social media; and the disbursement of money or items of value, or providing a service or the use of a facility; and
• Lastly, the activity that is undertaken pursuant to the foreign influence arrangement would have to be in relation to a political or government process at any order of government.

Relevant information from the registration will be held on the registry and would be available to the public to consult freely. The registry will be overseen and enforced by an independent Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner, housed within Public Safety Canada.  

The FITAA will come into force on a date to be determined by Governor-in-Council.

More information about the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.

Date modified:

2024-08-27